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I. INTRODUCTION
A convicted man's life hangs in the balance. The State seeks death, the
most irrevocable and severe penalty that the American criminal justice
system permits. The defendant's fate hinges on the answer to one question:
does an aggravating factor exist sufficient to permit the State to deprive that
man of his life? Who within the community, at that most decisive moment
in a man's life, answers that critical question? That was precisely the
problem posed to the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona.' For
many, the Court's decision meant the difference between life and death at
the hands of the State.2
When the Supreme Court decided Ring, two such men languished on
Colorado's death row.3 In the cases of George William Woldt and Francisco
Martinez, Jr., three-judge panels answered the question posed above and
sentenced each man to die.4 Due to the Supreme Court's decision in Ring,
both men are currently serving life sentences without the possibility of
parole, their very lives spared by the Sixth Amendment protections
announced in Ring.5
The United States Constitution provides that the State may not deprive
an individual of his life without due process 6 nor inflict cruel and unusual
punishments.7  The Constitution further provides that each individual
1. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
2. As of January 1, 2002, there were 3,581 inmates on death row in the United States. U.S.
Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 2001 (Dec. 2002), at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp01.pdf.
3. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 259-61 (Colo. 2003).
4. Id. at 260-61.
5. Id. at 266-72.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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accused of a crime has the right to a trial by an impartial jury.8 Courts
nationwide have long struggled with the meaning of these portions of our
nation's most cherished document in the context of the death penalty. 9
In 1972, the Supreme Court began the modem line of death penalty case
law in Furman v. Georgia,'0 virtually foreclosing capital punishment in the
United States." In that decision, the Court mandated that while the
Constitution did not outlaw the death penalty per se, states could not impose
capital sentences without certain procedural controls to guide the sentencer's
discretion and ensure that states did not administer capital punishment in an
arbitrary manner.'
2
In response to Furman, states implemented certain statutorily mandated
"aggravating factors," without which a capital defendant could not receive a
death sentence.' 3 States designed these "aggravating factors" to guide the
sentencer's discretion and ensure that they did not dispense capital sentences
in an arbitrary or capricious manner.' 4  In 2002, thirty years after Furman,
the Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona finally provided the states with
guidance as to who must determine the existence of those aggravating
factors.' 5
At approximately 6:30 PM on November 28, 1994, a Sheriff's deputy
from Maricopa County, Arizona discovered a missing armored van in a
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does
not require jury determination of aggravating factors in capital sentencing); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) (finding Georgia's capital sentencing scheme consistent with the Eighth
Amendment); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion) (finding that the Eighth
Amendment requires guided discretion in capital sentencing).
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion).
11. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-240: Joseph L. Hoffman, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the
Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 259-60 (2001) ("[I]n Furman v. Georgia, the Court struck
down all then-existing state capital punishment statutes on the ground that they violated the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause because the death penalty was being imposed
under such statutes in an arbitrary and unpredictable manner"); Daniel Ross Harris, Note, Capital
Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the "Death is Different" Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 1389, 1390 (1991) ("Furman declared all existing death penalty statutes unconstitutional as a
violation of the eighth amendment bar against cruel and unusual punishment").
12. Furman, 408 U.S. 238; Jeffrey Alan Wellek, Eighth Amendment-Trial Court May Impose
Death Sentence Despite Jur's Recommendation of Life Imprisonment: Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S.
Ct. 3154 (1984), 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 813, 814 (1984).
13. Gary Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 786,
788 (1983); Richard E. Wirick, Comment, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion
After Zant, Barclay, and Harris, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689, 689-90 (1984); see, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2503 (1973 & Supp.
1983).
14. Goodpaster, supra note 13, at 788.
15. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. Ring stands for the proposition that if the death penalty is
unavailable without the finding of aggravating factors, a jury must find those factors unless the
defendant waives the jury trial right. See id.
church parking lot. 16 The van's engine was running and the driver was dead,
the victim of a single gunshot wound to the head.' 7 After a lengthy
investigation, the State of Arizona indicted Timothy Stuart Ring, along with
two other men, for the robbery and murder. 8 A jury found Ring guilty of
felony murder, basing the decision largely on circumstantial evidence. 19
After a sentencing hearing, the trial judge found that Timothy Ring
killed the van's driver and that Ring was a major participant in the robbery.20
The judge, identifying two aggravating factors and insufficient mitigating
factors to warrant leniency, sentenced Ring to death. 2' The Arizona
Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.22 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 23  The Supreme Court overruled
Ring's death sentence based upon its recent decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey.24 In Ring the Court held the Arizona capital sentencing statute
unconstitutional because it allowed a judge rather than a jury to determine
the existence of facts necessary to expose a defendant to a death sentence.25
Thus, Ring stands for the proposition that "[c]apital defendants... are
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature
conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. 2
6
The Court's decision in Ring produced a profound effect on capital
sentencing in the United States. 7 Ring effectively struck down the schemes
of seven states, and cast considerable doubt on the schemes of at least four
others.28 The Court's decision immediately resulted in numerous challenges
16. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1142 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc).
17. Id. at 1142.
18. Id. at 1142-44.
19. Id. at 1144.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1144-45. The aggravating factors present were that Ring committed the offense "'in
expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value"' and "'in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner."' Id. (quoting the transcript of Ring's sentencing hearing).
22. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1156.
23. Ring v. Arizona, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002).
24. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608-09.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 589.
27. As a result of Ring, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska. and Nevada changed their capital sentencing procedures. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-703.01 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit
11, § 4209 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Michie
2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-401 (2002); 2003 Mont.
Laws 154 § 1; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554 & 175.556 (2003); see
also State v. Jones, 49 P.3d 273 (Ariz. 2002) (recognizing that Ring declared Arizona's capital
sentencing scheme unconstitutional); Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003) (acknowledging
that Ring rendered Colorado's capital sentencing statute unconstitutional); State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d
874, 875 (Idaho 2002) (conceding that Ring rendered Idaho's capital sentencing procedure
unconstitutional); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (confirming that Ring rendered
part of Missouri's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604
(Neb. 2003) (declaring that Ring rendered Nebraska's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional);
Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2002) (finding that Ring declared multiple aspects of Nevada's
capital sentencing procedure unconstitutional).
28. Ring, 536 U.S. at 620-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Ring likely invalidated the
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to death sentences nationwide.29 Within fourteen months of the Ring
decision, eight states altered their capital sentencing procedures in order to
conform to the newly mandated Constitutional protections.3°
The purpose of this note is to examine the Supreme Court's decision in
Ring v. Arizona in the context of late twentieth century Supreme Court
capital punishment jurisprudence. First, Part II will examine the history of
American Eighth Amendment capital punishment jurisprudence beginning
with Furman v. Georgia, the Court's 1972 decision that shaped the Eighth
Amendment constitutional limitations on capital punishment to the present
day. 3 Second, Part III will examine the recent history of Supreme Court
Sixth Amendment sentencing decisions to the extent that they pertain to the
Court's decision in Ring. Third, Parts IV and V will scrutinize the Ring
decision itself. Finally, Part VI will address the impact of the Ring decision
on states that currently dispense capital punishment in a manner similar to
that previously employed by Arizona.
II. QUALIFIED TO DIE? THE MODERN HISTORY OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The modem history of the American death penalty begins in 1972 with
the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, which drastically
altered the constitutional landscape for capital punishment.32 In Furman, the
Court refused to find capital punishment per se unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment.33 The Court, in a brief but cryptic five-to-four opinion
in which each justice wrote separately with none of the justices joining each
schemes in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska while also casting doubt upon those in
Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana). In addition, the Nevada Supreme Court subsequently
recognized Ring's effect on Nevada's death penalty eligibility procedure. See Johnson, 59 P.3d at
460-63 (striking down portions of Nevada's scheme in light of Ring); accord Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d
at 253 (confirming that Ring rendered part of Missouri's capital sentencing scheme
unconstitutional). For a more comprehensive discussion of states affected by Ring, see supra note
27 and infra Part VI.
29. As of August 1, 2003, courts had decided more than 300 cases involving Ring-based issues
both in state and federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Va.
2002) (finding the Federal Death Penalty Act consistent with Ring); Jones, 49 P.3d 273 (Ariz. 2002)
(recognizing Ring's impact on Arizona's capital sentencing procedure); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.
2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (upholding Florida's scheme); Jones v. State, 780 N.E.2d 373 (Ind. 2002)
(finding Ring requirements fulfilled); Johnson, 59 P.3d at 450 (striking down portions of Nevada's
scheme in light of Ring).
30. See supra notes 28-29.
31. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Captain Michael E. Pfau & Captain Eugene R.
Milhizer, The Military Death Penalty and the Constitution: There is Life After Furman, 97 MIL. L.
REV. 35 (1982).
32. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238. The Court's Furman decision invalidated nearly every capital
sentencing scheme in the United States. John W. Poulos, Liability Rules. Sentencing Factors, and
the Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial: A Preliminary Inquiry, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 643, 645
(1990).
33. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238; Poulos, supra note 32, at 645.
other's opinion, ruled that capital punishment was unconstitutional as
applied in the cases before it.34 The Furman Court sent the message to states
wishing to continue dispensation of capital punishment that "unfettered
capital sentencing discretion violates the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the [E]ighth [A]mendment., 35  This message sent a shockwave
through the legal community because it meant that most states' capital
sentencing statutes applied death in an unconstitutional manner,36 and that in
the eyes of the Supreme Court, death is different than other forms of
punishment.37
The "death is different" doctrine arose out of Furman when Justice
Stewart, in one of the nine separate opinions, wrote:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total
irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our
concept of humanity.38
The philosophy that "death is different" has proved an omnipresent theme in
capital punishment jurisprudence in the thirty years following Furman.39
Because capital punishment is unlike any other in the American criminal
justice system, the Eighth Amendment entitles a capital defendant to certain
procedural safeguards. 40 However, Furman failed to specifically outline the
34. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40; David Dolinko, Foreword: How to Criticize the Death Penalty,
77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546, 548 n.9 (1986).
35. Poulos, supra note 32, at 645. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
36. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty. 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1047,
1056 (1991) (stating that in the years immediately following Furman, thirty-five of the thirty-nine
death penalty states enacted new capital sentencing statutes in reaction to Furman).
37. Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
38. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
39. Numerous decisions and commentators have reiterated that "death is different" in sustaining
that philosophy. See, e.g., Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 127 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("[Dleath is indeed a penalty 'different' from all others."): Streetman v. Lynaugh, 484
U.S. 992, 996 (1988) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("Death is certainly different ....");
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) ("[D]eath is a punishment different from
all other sanctions in kind rather than degree."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (noting
that Furman recognized death is different); American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section,
Report to the House of Delegates, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 28 (1990) ("[Dleath is different from all
other criminal penalties."); Daniel Ross Harris, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A
Retreat From the "Death is Different" Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1389 (1991); David McCord,
Visions of Habeas, 1994 BYU L. REV. 735, 783-86, 790-92 (1994) (recognizing the "death is
different" philosophy in Furman and numerous subsequent decisions).
40. William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat
From its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 738 (1985) (stating that the Court
required "super due process" in death penalty cases because death "is qualitatively different"); see
Furman, 408 U.S. at 283-91 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the heightened due process
requirements for capital punishment implicit in the Bill of Rights).
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exact safeguards necessary to rectify the constitutional failings announced in
that decision.4 '
The Furman Court seemed to hold that in order for the death penalty to
pass constitutional muster, it must not be "so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed" as it had been in the past.42 Rather, the defendant is entitled to
freedom from arbitrary or discriminatory application of a punishment so
unique that when imposed without the proper safeguards, 3 it becomes "cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual."'44
States responded to Furman with newly drafted death penalty statutes.45
These new statutes then faced the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. 6 In those
challenges the Court upheld certain schemes and struck down others,
providing the states with both a model of how they may proceed and an
example of the manner in which the Constitution prohibits them from meting
out capital punishment.4 7 Gregg v. Georgia clarified Furman with the
mandate that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so
grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.,48 The Gregg
Court found Georgia's new capital sentencing scheme constitutional.4 9
The Gregg Court characterized the Georgia scheme as a bifurcated trial,
with the first phase conducted to determine guilt and the second devoted to
sentencing.5 °  In the penalty phase, the Georgia scheme provided for
sentencing discretion in the form of certain statutory "aggravating
circumstances," which served to guide the sentencing authority by
41. The Court's Furman decision focused primarily on the infirmities of the statutes challenged
in that case rather than on the probable remedies necessitated by the decision. See, e.g., Furman,
408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring); William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness
and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067,
1067-68 (1983).
42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 242-43 (Douglas, J., concurring)
44. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. Higginbotham, supra note 36, at 1056.
46. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia's bifurcated proceeding
providing for guided discretion and automatic judicial review); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976) (finding mandatory death statutes unconstitutional).
47. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153-54 (upholding Georgia's bifurcated proceeding providing for
guided discretion and automatic judicial review); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280 (finding that statutes
providing for mandatory imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes are unconstitutional).
48. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
49. Id. at 207; see also Catherine Hancock, The Perils of Calibrating the Death Penalty Through
Special Definitions of Murder, 53 TUL. L. REV. 828, 829-30 (1979) (noting that while the Supreme
Court struck down mandatory death penalty statutes, "the same plurality ... found the 'guided
discretion' schemes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas to possess sufficient guidance and
individualization to avoid the constitutional failing of arbitrariness").
50. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-98.
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characterizing certain circumstances of either the crime or the defendant's
character as particularly worthy of a death sentence.5' Once the Court
reached this decision, the Georgia scheme, as endorsed by Gregg, became
the model for the statutory schemes of other states.52
The Court further clarified Gregg in Proffitt v. Florida.53  There, the
Court found the Florida capital sentencing scheme, which was similar to
Georgia's system, constitutional in how it dispensed capital punishment.54
The Florida scheme used the same type of bifurcated proceeding as in
Gregg, where the jury considered whether certain aggravating circumstances
existed, and then weighed those against any mitigating factors to determine
whether to sentence the defendant to life in prison or to death. The
primary difference between the Georgia and Florida statutes was the
allocation of authority to actually impose a sentence of death.56 The Georgia
scheme allotted sentencing authority to the jury, whereas in Florida, the
jury's verdict as to life or death was merely advisory.57 Once the Florida
jury reached its verdict by a majority vote, the judge was then free to follow
the jury's recommendation or to override it and sentence the defendant as he
or she saw fit.58 The Court upheld this system, stating that while "jury
sentencing in a capital case can perform an important societal function ...
[this Court] has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally
required."
59
The Court elaborated on the Proffitt holding in Spaziano v. Florida,6 °
another challenge to the Florida capital sentencing statute.6' Spaziano dealt
with an Eighth Amendment challenge to a death sentence imposed over the
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment based on the claim that the
Constitution entitled a defendant to jury sentencing in capital cases.62
Because neither the Eighth nor the Sixth Amendment requires jury
sentencing, and because neither fairness nor reliability in capital cases
necessitates it, the Spaziano Court refused to conclude "that placing
51. Id. at 196-98.
52. Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the
Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE 81, 81-113 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
Following Georgia's lead, all of the thirty-eight death penalty states now emply aggravating factors
in some form in order to guide the discretion of the sentencing authority. See Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002).
53. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
54. Id. at 242; see also Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice
of Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31, 40 n.56 (1985).
55. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-50.
56. Compare the Florida scheme described in Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 249-53, to that of Georgia as
depicted in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-98.
57. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252.
58. Id. at 249.
59. Id. at 252 (citation omitted).
60. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
61. Id. at 449.
62. Id. at 449-54.
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responsibility on the trial judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is
unconstitutional. 6 3
In his dissent, Justice Stevens challenged the notion that capital
sentencing does not require jury sentencing. 64 Justice Stevens pointed out
that Florida's scheme turned a death penalty trial into a "trifurcated"
proceeding, in which the jury first decided guilt, then rendered an advisory
verdict, but the judge then imposed the actual sentence.65 Justice Stevens
then stated that the Court left the constitutionality of Florida's "trifurcated"
sentencing procedure an open question.66 Justice Stevens further argued that
the link between community standards and the imposition of the death
penalty is ingrained in the history of capital punishment, and that the jury's
function accordingly legitimizes capital punishment.67
The issue of the capital jury's role faced yet another challenge in 1989
when a defendant attacked Florida's capital sentencing scheme in Hildwin v.
Florida.68  In Hildwin, a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree
murder and returned a unanimous advisory verdict in support of the death
penalty. 69 The judge then sentenced the defendant to death providing written
findings of four statutory aggravating factors.7 ° In a per curiam opinion, the
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment allows the judge to make the
"written findings [of aggravating factors] that authorize imposition of a
death sentence when the jury unanimously recommends a death sentence."'"
In 1990, the focus shifted to Arizona when the Supreme Court addressed
that state's capital sentencing scheme, a system in which the jury rendered a
verdict of guilt, and the judge made the findings of aggravating factors and
mitigating circumstances leading to imposition of either a sentence of life
63. Id. at 464; Cynthia M. McKnight, Right to Jury Trial, 82 GEO. L.J. 1033, 1035-36 (1994)
(arguing that Spaziano stood for the proposition that "the right to a jury trial does not extend to
sentencing determinations"); Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a
Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1989) (noting that
according to Spaziano, a judge may constitutionally "make the sentencing decision in capital
cases").
64. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 470-71.
66. Id. at 470 n.4.
67. Id. at 483-85.
68. 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 638-39.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 640; see also White, supra note 63, at 1-2 (noting that Hildwin affirmed Spaziano's
holding that the Constitution permits a judge to make sentencing determinations in capital cases);
Jodi L. Short & Mark D. Spoto, Capital Punishment, 82 GEO. L.J. 1199, 1206 (1994) ("Some states
require that the sentencer 'weigh' the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating
circumstances. Others merely require that the sentencer find a proper aggravating circumstance and
then. in determining whether the death penalty should be applied, consider all circumstances before
it.").
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imprisonment or death.72 In that case, Walton v. Arizona, the Court tackled
precisely the same issue that it would address in Ring v. Arizona in 2002.7 3
The Court granted certiorari in Walton to resolve the issue of judicial fact-
finding in capital sentencing addressed by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Adamson v. Ricketts,74 in which that court found the Arizona death penalty
statute unconstitutional. 75 The Arizona statute in question directed the judge
to conduct a separate sentencing hearing at which he or she determined the
existence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances and weighed those
found in order to determine whether the crime warranted a sentence of life
imprisonment or death.76
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Walton recognized the
similarities between the Florida and Arizona schemes, relying heavily on
their earlier decisions in Spaziano, Proffitt, and Hildwin.77 The Court
rejected the contention that in the Arizona scheme, the aggravating factors
acted as "elements of the offense" rather than sentencing factors, calling the
factors "standards" meant to guide the decision between life and death. 78
The Court reasoned that "the judge's finding of any particular aggravating
circumstance does not in and of itself 'convict' a defendant (i.e., require the
death penalty), and the failure to find any particular aggravating
circumstance does not 'acquit' a defendant (i.e., preclude the death
penalty). 79 Finally, the Court concluded that a State is not "required to
denominate aggravating circumstances 'elements' of the offense or permit
72. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
73. Compare Walton, 497 U.S. at 639 (dealing specifically with the constitutionality of the
Arizona scheme under which a trial judge made all findings of aggravation in order to make the
sentencing decisions), with Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (overturning Walton's holding that such a scheme
was constitutional stating, "[w]e overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge,
sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death
penalty").
74. 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988). The court in Adamson concluded that under the Arizona
scheme aggravating factors operated as elements of capital murder rather than simply as sentencing
factors and therefore the Sixth Amendment entitled the defendant to a jury determination of their
existence. Id. at 1029-31. At least one commentator recognized the Ninth Circuit's rationale in
Adamson as a valid constitutional doctrine because it defended the accused's Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial. See Poulos, supra note 32, at 669. Poulos recognized that:
The sixth amendment would fail to cabin legislative choices if a legislature could control
the jury trial right by simply designating that the court rather than a jury try a particular
issue. There is no reason to permit a legislature to achieve this same result by allocating
the litigation of an issue to a portion of the capital trial in which a jury is not required. A
rule permitting such a result would wholly fail to serve the purpose for including the right
to trial by jury in the sixth amendment.
Id.
75. Walton, 497 U.S. at 647; Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1043-45 (9th Cir. 1988).
76. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2002) (instructing the court on the matter of
judicial fact-finding and sentencing in subsection (B) and defining aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in subsections (F) and (G) respectively). The statute further provided that the
prosecution shouldered the burden of proof for aggravating circumstances while the burden of
proving mitigating factors was bome by the defendant. Id.
77. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-49.
78. Id. at 648.
79. Id. (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 (1986) (citation omitted)).
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only a jury to determine the existence of such circumstances. 8 °  Thus,
Walton stood for the proposition that it is constitutionally permissible to
allow a judge alone to hear evidence and make the life or death decision.8'
Justice Stevens remained convinced that the Sixth Amendment required
otherwise.82 In dissent, Justice Stevens maintained that both of the
aggravating factors found in Walton concerned the offense and not the
offender, casting a specter of elements rather than sentencing factors.83
Further, the aggravating factors acted as elements because in their absence
the defendant could not be subject to a death sentence. 84 Only through a
finding of one or more aggravating factors could a defendant become
eligible for a death sentence; the penalty was unavailable without them. 85
Justice Stevens expressed a belief that where factors exposed a criminal
defendant to a punishment that he could not have faced in their absence, the
Sixth Amendment requires that a jury determine the existence of those
factors.86 Justice Stevens' language would reappear frequently throughout
the next decade in the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in the
context of criminal sentencing procedure, finally coming to a crest in
Apprendi and Ring.87
III. AT THE CROSSROADS OF DEATH: THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF
SIXTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING JURISPRUDENCE
At the same time that the Court addressed the role of the jury in capital
sentencing, it also considered that role in the context of lesser felonious
offenses.88 Many of these cases, decided from the 1980s to the 1990s,
provided guidance for the Court's decision to overturn Walton.89
80. Id. at 649.
81. Earl Martin, Towards an Evolving Debate on the Decency of Capital Punishment, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 84, 84 n.l (1997).
82. Walton, 497 U.S. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 710 n.2.
84. Id. at 709- 10.
85. Id. at 709.
86. Id. at 709-10.
87. See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (2002) ("Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors
operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment
requires that they be found by a jury.") (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19
(2002)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 253 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("I set forth as my considered view, that it is unconstitutional to remove from the jury
the assessment of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed."); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 241 (1998)
(suggesting that the Constitution may require that most sentencing factors be treated as elements).
88. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 (stating that any factor that
529
A. Mullaney v. Wilbur9°
In 1975, the Court addressed due process in the context of sentencing in
a challenge to Maine's homicide statute. 91 The Court recognized a hierarchy
in homicide cases based upon the "degree of criminal culpability[,]" which
inevitably leads to a stratified sentencing scheme where those who are less
blameworthy receive less severe penalties.92 The Court also recognized that
the state statutory definitions of "[sentencing] factors" and "elements of the
crime" necessary to reach particular sentencing levels were not necessarily
dispositive in determining how each actually functioned.93 The majority
noted that if the statutory construction were dispositive, a State might
circumvent due process by defining elements that constitute different crimes
as factors that bore only on the "extent of punishment[,]" thus removing the
reasonable doubt standard.94
B. Patterson v. New York
95
In 1977, the Court once again addressed the issue of due process in
criminal sentencing in Patterson v. New York, a case that served as an
integral part of the Court's decisions in Apprendi and Ring.96 Patterson
seemed to limit Mullaney when the Court refused to allocate the burden of
disproving any affirmative defenses to the State, rather providing that once
the State proved the basic elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
the burden shifted to the defendant to prove any affirmative defenses. 97 The
subjects the defendant to a more serious level of sentencing must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247 (holding that recidivism, a classic sentencing
enhancement, need not be found by a jury); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)
(addressing factors that triggered imposition of a mandatory minimum within the prescribed
sentencing range allowed by the jury's finding); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)
(allocating the burden of proof for affirmative defenses to the defendant once the State had proven
the requisite elements of the offense); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (addressing the
functional operation of 'elements' versus 'sentencing factors' in Maine's murder statute in
determining that the definition of each was not necessarily dispositive).
89. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S at 466; Jones, 526 U.S. at 227. Ring extended the general rule
from Jones and Apprendi to capital cases when the Court stated that "[t]he right to trial by jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the
factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding
necessary to put him to death." Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
90. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
91. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684-85.
92. Id. at 697-98.
93. Id. at 698-99. See generally Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis in Defining
Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983) (providing
definitional analysis with respect to the Model Penal Code).
94. Mullanev, 421 U.S. at 698.
95. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
96. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 197. The Court's decision in Apprendi stated that "Patterson
made clear that the state law still required the State to prove every element of that State's offense of
murder and its accompanying punishment." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485 n.12
(2000).
97. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207-210; see also Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A
Defense in Search of a Rationale. 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 421,423 n.18 (1982).
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Patterson Court further limited Mullaney by instructing that the Mullaney
holding did not require that the prosecution "prove beyond a reasonable
doubt any fact affecting 'the degree of criminal culpability.' 98 The Court
acknowledged certain constitutional limitations to the doctrine announced in
Patterson, noting that States were still bound to their constitutional burden
to prove guilt in order to overcome a presumption of evidence.99
C. McMillan v. Pennsylvania'00
In 1986, the Court directly addressed the issue of sentencing as it
pertained to the Sixth Amendment in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.'0 ' In
McMillan, the Court addressed a statute mandating that a defendant
convicted of certain felonies was subject to "a mandatory minimum sentence
of five years' imprisonment if the sentencing judge finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the person 'visibly possessed a firearm'
during the commission of the offense.' ' 10 2  The Court relied on Patterson
rather than Mullaney in deciding that the express definition of visible
possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor rather than an element, was
dispositive and within the constitutional limits of Patterson.'0 3 The Court in
McMillan did recognize that the Pennsylvania statute raised the ante on a
criminal defendant, but stated that it did so in an acceptable manner, by
imposing a minimum sentence allowable by the trial court.' 4 The Court
cited Spaziano, and in two brief sentences tersely disregarded the
defendant's contention that he was entitled to have a jury determine any
98. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214 n.15.
99. Id. at 210; see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523-25 (1958) ("It is of course within
the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the
burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion, 'unless in so doing it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."' (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))); Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943) ("[T]he legislature might validly command that the finding of an
indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the accused, should create a presumption of the existence
of all the facts essential to guilt. This is not permissible."); McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 241
U.S. 79, 86 (1916) (stating that "it is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual
guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime").
100. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
101. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79.
102. Id. at 81 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982)). The statute in question was the
Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act of 1982 requiring consideration of the
defendant's visible possession of a firearm after conviction for third degree murder, voluntary
manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, certain types of robbery, aggravated
assault, or kidnapping or the attempt to commit any of the above offenses. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9712 (1982). The statute specifically stated in subsection (b) that the provisions of the law should
not be treated as elements of the crimes themselves, but rather as sentencing factors. Id.
103. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86; see also Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws:
Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 77 n.70
(1993) (recognizing the Court's finding that the Pennsylvania statute was constitutional).
104. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89.
facts bearing on the offense committed and on the possible sentencing range
"even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact."' 5
Justice Stevens continued his pattern of unyielding dissent in this line of
Sixth Amendment cases.10 6 Justice Stevens' primary argument was that no
matter how Pennsylvania chose to define the act of visibly possessing a
firearm during the commission of an enumerated felony, the penal
consequences of that possession acted like an element of the crime and
should be treated as such, subject to the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment. 07 Justice Stevens astutely pointed out that the finding of
visible possession of a firearm subjected a convicted defendant to an
automatic increase in his sentence to a penalty "twice as severe as ... the
trial judge considered appropriate. 10 8
D. The Sixth Amendment in Motion: Almendarez-Torres v. United States'0 9
In 1998, the Court once again confronted the issue of sentencing factors
as opposed to elements of the offense subject to Sixth Amendment
protection."0  Almendarez-Torres v. United States began a line of Sixth
Amendment sentencing cases, which would culminate two years later in the
Apprendi ruling."' Each of the following three cases, Almendarez-Torres,
Jones, and Apprendi, would prove instrumental in the Court's decision in
Ring."l 2  Almendarez-Torres dealt with a challenge to a federal statute,
which prohibited an alien who was once deported from returning to the
United States and provided that such an offender would be subject to a
prison term of up to two years." 3 The subsequent section of 8 U.S.C. § 1326
further provided for a prison term of up to 20 years for "any alien described"
by subsection (a) if the initial "removal was subsequent to a conviction for
105. Id. at 93 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,459 (1984)).
106. Id. at 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 103.
109. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
110. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 224.
111. See id; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (stating that any fact, other than
that of a prior conviction, "that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 232 (1999) ("Much turns on the determination that a fact is an element of an
offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must be charged in the
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt."); see
also Laurence A. Benner, et al., Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Review of United States
Supreme Court Criminal and Habeas Corpus Decisions (October 4, 1999 - October 1, 2000), 37
CAL. W. L. REV. 239 (2001).
112. The Ring Court distinguished its holding in Almendarez-Torres and maintained the exception
that prior convictions may still enhance a defendant's sentence. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597
(2002). The Ring Court specifically employed the rule from Jones and Apprendi in deciding that a
jury must find aggravating factors necessary to subject the defendant to a capital sentence. Id. at
600-09.
113. The statute challenged in Almendarez- Torres was 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1997). Almendarez-
Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27.
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commission of an aggravated felony."'1 4 A defendant to whom a court had
applied this section after his guilty plea to subsection (a) specifically
challenged the statute.115
The Court conceded that the language of Mullaney suggested that a
judge may not increase a convicted defendant's sentence "in light of
recidivism, or any other factor, not set forth in an indictment and proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' 16 However, the majority used Patterson
to enervate Mullaney's holding as it pertained to the issue in Almendarez-
Torres.117 The Court specifically stated that Patterson suggested that the
"Constitution requires scarcely any sentencing factors to be treated [as
elements of the crime]."' 18  The Court then reiterated its holding from
Patterson that "'the state legislature's definition of the elements of the
offense is usually dispositive[J"' thereby suggesting that the legislature's
definition of sentencing factors was also dispositive." 9
The Almendarez-Torres majority recognized the distinction between
McMillan and the instant case; that here the statute did "alter the maximum
penalty for the crime[J" whereas in McMillan the statute merely prescribed
a mandatory minimum. 20 The majority pointed out that the imposition of a
mandatory minimum sentence "is no less, and may well be greater ... than a
permissive maximum. ...""' Further relying on McMillan, the Court
concluded that Congress possessed the power to treat a prior conviction for
an aggravated felony as a sentencing factor in the framework of illegal entry
after deportation.1 22  The Court also noted that a contrary rule would
undermine its decisions in Hildwin, Spaziano, and Walton, thereby
recognizing the link between the Court's rule that a capital defendant lacked
the right to jury determination of factors making that defendant eligible for
the death penalty and the current line of Sixth Amendment sentencing cases
for non-capital offenses. 1
23
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1997).
115. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27.
116. Id. at 240.
117. id. at 240-41; see Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 400-02
(2002); Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-land": Statutory Minimums
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 393-96 (2002).
118. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 241.
119. id. at 242 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (citing Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977))).
120. Id. at 243 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87).
121. id. at 245.
122. Id. at 246. The Court discussed the historical background of criminal law in concluding that
prior convictions operate as sentencing factors because "'recidivism ... is a traditional, if not the
most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence[,]' adding that a
prior criminal history is not part of the offense itself but rather the product of previous judicial
proceedings that provided the requisite procedural protections of the Constitution. Huigens, supra
note 117, at 403-04 (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243).
123. See AImendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247.
The majority's decision and rationale in Almendarez-Torres provoked a
caustic dissent from Justice Scalia. 24 The dissent first framed the issue
facing the Court as a question of "whether the Constitution requires a fact
which substantially increases the maximum permissible punishment for a
crime to be treated as an element of that crime-to be charged in the
indictment, and found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury."'' 25  Justice
Scalia then based his analysis on the Court's rule that, "'where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.""
' 26
Justice Scalia vigorously argued that the issue at hand was indeed a
muddy one and that the above proposition should control. 2 7 His dissent
drew support from the Court's holdings in Mullaney, and to some extent
McMillan.128 Justice Scalia argued that the majority in McMillan, of which
he was a part, specifically limited that decision to situations in which only a
mandatory minimum sentence was at issue, while it emphasized repeatedly
that no increase in the maximum sentence was at issue. 29 The dissent then
harshly criticized the majority for its position that an increase in the
permissible maximum was more advantageous to the defendant than the
imposition of an increased mandatory minimum, on the basis that McMillan
soundly rejected such an argument. 130 In addition, Justice Scalia's dissent
characterized the majority's holding as repeatedly stressing its limitation to
the particular sentencing factor of recidivism, rather than applying that rule
to sentencing factors in general. '
3
'
E. A Head of Steam: Jones v. United States 32
The tide turned for the Court's Sixth Amendment sentencing
jurisprudence one year after Almendarez-Torres, when the Court addressed a
challenge to a federal carjacking statute in Jones v. United States.'33 In
Jones, the defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, which provided
in essence that any person possessing a firearm who takes or attempts to take
a motor vehicle from an individual "by force and violence or by
124. Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 248.
126. Id. at 250 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
127. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 252, 257-58 (recognizing that Mullaney's limitations exist on legislatures' ability to
label elements of crimes and stating that McMillan rejected the argument that an increase in the
allowable maximum was more advantageous to an accused than a mandatory minimum).
129. Id. at 253 ("Pennsylvania's law did not transgress [the constitutional limitations of Patterson]
primarily because it 'neither alter[ed] the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor create[d] a
separate offense ....') (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986)).
130. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 254 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 257-58.
132. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
133. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 227.
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intimidation," shall be fined or imprisoned not more than fifteen years. 134
Subsection (2) of the statute provided that the possible maximum penalty
increased to twenty-five years if serious bodily injury resulted, and
subsection (3) further increased the possible maximum to life in the case that
death resulted.135 The indictment failed to mention any of the subsections,
nor did it charge any facts that would prove application thereof.
136
In addition, the trial judge informed the defendant that the maximum
penalty was fifteen years, and the jury instructions contained only reference
to the first paragraph, omitting any mention of serious bodily injury or
death. 137 After the jury found the defendant guilty of the charged offense,
the court held a sentencing hearing at which the pre-sentence report
recommended a twenty-five-year sentence under subsection (2) because
serious bodily injury resulted to the victim. 138  Over the defendant's
objections, the trial judge imposed a twenty-five-year sentence, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed based on its reading of the statute as not setting
out elements of separate crimes, but rather sentencing guidelines. 1
39
Because "[m]uch turns on the determination that a fact is an element of
an offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must
be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the
Government beyond a reasonable doubt," Jones necessitated a determination
of whether the second two subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 served as
elements or sentencing factors, despite the fact that they appeared to operate
as the latter. 140 The Court struggled with two possible interpretations of the
statute: first, that Congress intended serious bodily injury as an element of
an aggravated offense punishable by up to twenty-five years imprisonment;
and second, that Congress intended serious bodily injury simply as a
sentencing enhancement. 14 ' The majority opinion relied on the very
language utilized by the dissent in Almendarez-Torres, that "'where a statute
is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.""
142
The Court then issued a paragraph that would open the door for its
future Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, predictive of its decisions in
134. Id. at 230 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1998)).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1998).
136. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230-31.
137. Id. at 231.
138. Id.
139. Id. at231-32.
140. id. at 232.
141. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 239.
142. Id. at 239 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 408 (1909)); see also Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 250 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Apprendi and Ring.143  The Court recognized the "grave and doubtful
constitutional question"'1" raised by 18 U.S.C. § 2119 in stating:
[i]f serious bodily injury were merely a sentencing factor under §
2119(2) (increasing the authorized penalty by two thirds, to 25
years), then death would presumably be nothing more than a
sentencing factor under subsection (3) (increasing the penalty range
to life). If a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to life on a
nonjury determination, the jury's role would correspondingly shrink
from the significance usually carried by determinations of guilt to
the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping: in some cases, a
jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 15-year sentence
would merely open the door to a judicial finding sufficient for life
imprisonment. It is therefore no trivial question to ask whether
recognizing an unlimited legislative power to authorize
determinations setting ultimate sentencing limits without a jury
would invite erosion of the jury's function to a point against which
a line must necessarily be drawn. 145
Jones announced the rule that under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
"any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.",146 In announcing that rule, the Court
expressly distinguished, and thereby limited, its holding in Almendarez-
Torres by pointing out that recidivism need not be charged and proved to a
jury in order for the prior offense to operate as a sentencing enhancement.1 47
In fact, the Court explicitly stated:
The Court's repeated emphasis on the distinctive significance of
recidivism leaves no question that the Court regarded that fact as
potentially distinguishable for constitutional purposes from other
facts that might extend the range of possible sentencing .... One
basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness is not hard to
see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the
possible penalty for an offense, and certainly unlike the factor
before us in this case, a prior conviction must itself have been
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable
doubt, and jury trial guarantees. 148
143. See Benjamin J. Priester, Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281, 281-84 (2001) (asserting that Apprendi would likely "have a
significant impact on the administration of criminal justice in federal and state courts").
144. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 408.
145. Jones, 526 U.S. at 239, 243-44.
146. Id. at 243 n.6.
147. See id. at 248-49 (stating that "a prior conviction must itself have been established through
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees").
148. Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
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The implications of the Jones holding, specifically the above statement,
would prove wide reaching in the next three years of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence as these words opened the door through which Apprendi and
Ring entered, a fact astutely recognized by the dissent written by Justice
Kennedy and joined by Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Breyer. 4 9 At the
conclusion of the majority's opinion, the Court recognized and distinguished
its previous decisions in Spaziano, Hildwin, and Walton.5 ° In fact, the
concurrence of Justice Stevens unequivocally acknowledged that the Jones
decision placed Walton in jeopardy.' 5'
F. Collision Course: Apprendi v. New Jersey
52
1. The Majority Sets the Stage for Ring
In 2000, the seminal case in establishing the necessary precedent for
overturning Arizona's capital sentencing scheme strode through that door
opened by Jones in the form of Apprendi v. New Jersey.'53 In Apprendi, the
defendant challenged a New Jersey sentencing enhancement scheme on
Sixth Amendment grounds. 54 The statute allowed for between five and ten
years imprisonment for possessing a firearm for an unlawful purpose. 55 A
separate statute (dealing with hate crimes) provided for an extended term of
ten to twenty years in the case that a judge finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that "[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose
to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color,
gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity."'
5 6
149. See id. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's sweeping constitutional discussion
casts doubt on sentencing practices and assumptions followed not only in the federal system but also
in many States."); Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog":
Finding "Elements" of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1057, 1112-18 (1999) (recognizing that Jones simply created an environment for further debate).
150. Jones, 526 U.S. at 250-51. The Court stated that Spaziano did not address the issue
presented in Jones because Spaziano dealt with jury sentencing in capital cases, not the specific fact-
finding necessary for imposition of a particular sentencing range. Id. at 250. The Court added that
one could not construe Hildwin to control the issue because the jury in Hildwin recommended death,
thus demonstrating the jury's engagement in the "factfinding required for imposition of a higher
sentence." Id. at 250-51.
151. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that Walton should be reconsidered "in due
course").
152. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
153. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466. The Court expressly based Ring on the rule of Apprendi that
defendants are entitled to "a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an
increase in their maximum punishment." Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).
154. See generally Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466.
155. Id. at 468-69 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 39-4(a) and 43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
156. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 44-3(e) and 43-7(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1999-2000)).
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The defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea-agreement and faced a
maximum of twenty years increased to a maximum of thirty years should the
judge apply the enhancement. 57 The judge applied the enhancement based
on the hate crime statute and sentenced the defendant to twelve years, a
sentence that the defendant challenged, claiming that the enhancement was
an element of the offense, thus requiring proof to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 58 Relying on McMillan and Almendarez-Torres, The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed. 5 9 The Supreme Court decision that would follow
"will surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law," as
it imposed "as a constitutional rule the principle it first identified in
Jones."'160 The Court's decision less than two years later in Ring would
confirm Justice O'Connor's statement.
16 1
The Apprendi Court first relied on Jones, in which it had considered a
federal statute, and that decision's proposition that the Sixth Amendment
required that any fact which increased the maximum penalty allowable for a
crime be "'charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond
a reasonable doubt."" 162 Next, the Court turned to Blackstone for support.
163
It noted that "trial by jury has been understood to require that 'the truth of
every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of the indictment...
should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the
defendant's] equals and neighbours ....
In analyzing the history of criminal sentencing in America, the Court
pointed out that judges have always exercised discretion, but that their
discretion in considering sentencing factors has always been limited to
imposing a sentence within a particular range. 65 The key to the analysis of
Sixth Amendment protection is that due process requirements protect a
criminal defendant from loss of liberty by requiring that a jury render a
verdict subjecting that defendant to a range of possible penalties. 166 If the
defendant faces a punishment greater than the maximum possible sentence
according to the facts reflected in that jury's verdict, the defendant loses his
Sixth Amendment protections against loss of liberty. 1
67
The Court addressed the State's argument that the facts in question
operated as "sentencing factors" by using Mullaney, and by distinguishing
157. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
158. Id. at 471.
159. See generally State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
160. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (overturning Walton).
162. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
163. Id. at 477 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343
(1769)).
164. Id. at 477 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343
(1769)); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment secures a right to a jury trial for serious offenses).
165. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
166. Id. at 482-84.
167. Id.
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its decisions from McMillan and Almendarez-Torres. 68  The Court first
pointed out that in Mullaney, it had determined that the due process
requirements of the Sixth Amendment and In re Winship, in which the court
determined that every criminal defendant was entitled to a determination of
guilt by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt, may extend not simply to the
determination of guilt, but to the length of the sentence as well. 169
Next, the Court addressed the ramifications of its decision in McMillan,
in which the Supreme Court first coined the term "sentencing factor" to
mean "a fact that was not found by a jury but that could affect the sentence
imposed by the judge."'7 °  In analyzing the State's McMillan claim in
Apprendi, the Court began by restating its position from Winship that "(1)
constitutional limits exist to states' authority to define away facts necessary
to constitute a criminal offense, and (2) that a state scheme that keeps from
the jury facts that 'expos[e] [defendants] to greater or additional
punishment' may raise serious constitutional concern."' 7'   The Court then
distinguished McMillan because there, the statute in question only worked to
limit the sentencer's discretion within the acceptable range, whereas the
statute in Apprendi exposed the defendant to a greater penalty than that
possible based upon the jury's verdict. 72
Finally, Apprendi limited Almendarez-Torres to cases involving
sentencing enhancements based on prior convictions.'73 This distinguishing
factor is significant because, as the Court stated, earlier convictions carry
"substantial procedural safeguards of their own," such as the right to a jury
trial and a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 74 Therefore, the
standard for enhancing a sentence based on facts not found by a jury is
different than the standard for an enhancement based on facts which a jury
has already found. 175
Thus, the Apprendi Court announced its decision, one which paved the
way for Ring, that any fact, other than a prior conviction, "that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'176 The Court
further endorsed the rule set forth in the Jones concurring opinions of
Justices Stevens and Scalia that "it is unconstitutional for a legislature to
168. Id. at 484-90, 496.
169. Id. at 484; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
170. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485.
171. Id. at 486 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)) (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 486. The statue addressed in McMillan involved a mandatory minimum sentence
rather than an increase in the allowable maximum. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80-83.
173. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487-88, 496.
174. Id. at488.
175. ld.
176. See id. at 490.
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remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed
range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.,
177
Interestingly, the majority opinion in Apprendi distinguished Walton on
the basis that it dealt with capital sentencing. 178 Justice Thomas elaborated
on this position in his concurring opinion. 179 Justice Thomas characterized
the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence as a unique situation, one in
which the Court has imposed "special constraints on a legislature's ability to
determine what facts shall lead to what punishment.... , 1 80 Justice Thomas
recognized that the Court has "restricted the legislature's ability to define
crimes.""'' This distinguishing point is particularly puzzling considering the
Ring Court's reliance on Apprendi in overturning Walton, a point not lost in
the Apprendi dissent.1
82
2. The Dissent: Justice O'Connor Foresees the Impact
Because Justice O'Connor's dissent from Ring is, for the most part, a
restatement of her dissent in Apprendi, the Apprendi dissent necessitates
some attention. 83 Initially, the dissent focused on the Court's decision in
McMillan, which stated that not every fact with impact upon a defendant's
punishment need be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and further,
that a state legislature's definition of a crime's elements is usually
dispositive in determining what facts need be submitted to the jury. 84 The
dissent then argued that the majority erred when it dispensed with the
Court's longstanding precedent in cases such as McMillan, Patterson, and
Almendarez-Torres, relying instead upon a supposed history of common law
sentencing discretion and Blackstone's nineteenth century treatise on
criminal procedure.
85
177. Id. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
178. Apprendi, 530 U.S at 496-97.
179. Id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas referred to the Court's jurisprudence
beginning with Furman, where the Supreme Court mandated limited discretion for capital
sentencing, which led to the modem schemes involving the necessity of a finding of certain
"aggravating factors" in order to authorize a death sentence. Id. For a brief overview of Furman
and its progeny, see supra Part II of this note. For a more detailed discussion of the Furman
doctrine, see Lawrence A. Darby III, Comment, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-Death
Penalty as Currently Administered Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 47 TUL. L. REV.
1167 (1973); David R. Shieferstein, Note, The Death Penalty Cases: Shaping Substantive Criminal
Law, 58 IND. L.J. 187 (1982).
182. Compare Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (relying heavily on Apprendi to find the
Arizona method of death qualification unconstitutional), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 496-97
(2000) (distinguishing Walton from the issue in Almendariz-Torres), and id. at 523-55 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (recognizing the majority's mischaracterization of Walton).
183. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Ring, 536 U.S. at 619
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 525-36.
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The dissent accused the majority of categorizing Mullaney's holding to
mean that "the due process proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement
applies to those fact[s] ... that.. . make a difference in the degree of
punishment" but ignoring the Court's rejection of that broad interpretation
of Mullaney in the Court's Patterson decision. 186 Third, the dissent cited the
Court's precedent in Monge v. California,187 which stated that "'the Court
has rejected an absolute rule that an enhancement constitutes an element of
the offense any time that it increases the maximum sentence to which a
defendant is exposed.""188 Finally, the dissent recognized what the majority
rule in Apprendi meant for capital sentencing jurisprudence. 89  Justice
O'Connor's dissent harshly questioned the Court's reasoning in
distinguishing Walton, an argument that would gain force when the Ring
Court would later use Apprendi to overrule Walton.'90
IV. BACKDROP: THE HISTORY OF RING V. ARIZONA
In 2002, the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the Arizona statute it
had addressed twelve years earlier in Walton v. Arizona.' 9' The Court
granted certiorari to resolve the inconsistencies between its Walton decision
and its more recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence exemplified by Jones
and Apprendi.'92 The challenge came in the form of Timothy Stuart Ring,
perhaps the worst-case scenario for the State's abuse of the Arizona capital
sentencing scheme.' 93
186. Id. at 529-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977). Patterson explicitly limited Mullaney's holding:
Mullaney's holding, it is argued, is that the State may not permit the blameworthiness of
an act or the severity of punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the
presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden of proving the
presence or absence of that fact, as the case may be, beyond a reasonable doubt. In our
view, the Mullaney holding should not be so broadly read.
Id. at 214-15 (emphasis added).
187. 524 U.S. 721 (1998) (stating that a sentencing enhancement does not necessarily constitute
an element of an offense simply because it raises the permissible maximum).
188. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 536 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Monge, 524 U.S at 729).
189. Justice O'Connor correctly recognized that the rules announced in Jones and Apprendi could
overturn Walton. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 536-42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor characterized the majority's
distinction of Walton as "baffling," as she discussed the fact that in Arizona, a defendant may not
face a capital sentence without a finding of at least one aggravating factor. Id. at 538-39. This aptly
demonstrated that in the Arizona capital scheme, aggravating factors operated as sentencing
enhancements, and thus Walton should have controlled Apprendi. Id. at 538-39.
191. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
192. Id. at 588-89.
193. See id. at 584.
A. The Factual History
On November 28, 1994, Maricopa County, Arizona authorities found a
missing Wells Fargo armored delivery van in a church parking lot.194 The
van's engine was running and inside the police found the driver dead,
apparently from a gunshot wound to the head. 195 Over $500,000 in cash was
missing from the van. 196  After a prolonged investigation, the State of
Arizona indicted Timothy Stuart Ring, along with two co-conspirators, for
the robbery of the van and the murder of the driver. 197 The jury deadlocked
on the charge of premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony
murder, a crime punishable by death under the Arizona sentencing
scheme.' 98
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court summarized the findings at trial
as to defendant Ring.1 99 That court noted that evidence clearly connected
Ring to the proceeds of the robbery, but failed to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ring "was a major participant in the armed robbery or that he
actually murdered [the driver]. 2 ° ° In fact, evidence adduced at trial failed to
prove that Ring had planned, participated in, or been present at the scene of
the crime.20 '
According to the Arizona sentencing scheme, Ring was not eligible for
the death penalty unless certain aggravating factors existed and those factors
outweighed any mitigating factors.20 2 The Arizona death penalty statute
directed the trial judge to conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine
the existence of certain enumerated circumstances in order to determine the
appropriate sentence.20 3 The statute was very specific in its instructions that
"[t]he hearing shall be conducted before the court alone[,J" and "[t]he court
alone shall make all factual determinations required ... ,,204 The judge must
make the factual determinations necessary in order to find the presence of
the enumerated aggravating circumstances and is authorized to sentence the
defendant to death only if he or she finds the existence of at least one
aggravating circumstance.
20 5
194. Id. at 589.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 589-91.
198. Id. at 591; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current
version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2002).
199. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1142-45 (Ariz. 2001).
200. Id. at 1152.
201. Id. at 1152.
202. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592. The pertinent statute here provided that first-degree murder was
punishable by death under ARIZ. STAT. REV. ANN. § 13-703. ARIZ. STAT. REV. ANN. § 13-1105(C)
(West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at ARIZ. STAT. REV. ANN. § 13-1105(C) (West Supp.
2002)).
203. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 2002).
204. Id.
205. Id.: State v. White, 815 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1991) (stating that one and only one aggravating
factor is necessary to impose a death sentence).
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After the jury found Ring guilty and before his sentencing hearing, one
of his co-conspirators pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and, in
exchange for a twenty-seven-and-one-half-year sentence, agreed to
cooperate in the State's case against Ring.20 6 The State called Ring's co-
conspirator at the sentencing hearing and elicited testimony that Ring and a
third man had planned the robbery for months before it occurred and that, in
his opinion, Ring had been the leader and primary planner of the crime.20 7
He further testified that Ring was the gunman, shooting the driver from a
distance with a rifle equipped with a silencer.20 8
The judge made numerous findings at the conclusion of the sentencing
hearing. 209  First, according to the United States Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in Enmund v. Florida2'0 and Tison v. Arizona,2 t' a defendant
may not be subjected to a death sentence without a finding that he was either
a major participant in the crime that led to the killing 21 2 or that he exhibited
"a reckless disregard for human life.,213 "Citing Greenham's testimony at
the sentencing hearing, the judge concluded that Ring 'is the one who shot
and killed [the driver].' 21 4 Due to the presence of the mandatory Enmund-
Tison findings, coupled with the presence of two aggravating factors and the
absence of mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency, the judge
sentenced Ring to death.1 5
B. The Procedural History
In reviewing Ring's sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court immediately
recognized that, in light of recent United States Supreme Court rulings in
Jones and Apprendi, the viability of Walton v. Arizona, the controlling case
on Arizona's death penalty scheme, was in serious doubt.216 However, the
Arizona Supreme Court also acknowledged that a majority of the Court had
refused to expressly overrule Walton in their Apprendi decision." 7 The
206. Ring, 536 U.S. at 593-94.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1144-45 (Ariz. 2001).
210. 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that a defendant could not receive the death penalty because he
did not kill, attempt to kill, or contemplate that death would occur in the commission of a robbery
during which an accomplice committed the actually killing).
211. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). Tison held that major participation in a crime leading to a felony
murder conviction coupled "with reckless indifference to human life is sufficient to satisfy the
Enmund culpability requirement [and impose the death penalty]." Id. at 158.
212. See generally Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782.
213. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157.
214. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 594 (2002).
215. Id. at 594-96.
216. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1150 (Ariz. 2001).
217. Id. at 1150.
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Arizona court then explained Arizona's capital sentencing scheme from the
State's point of view.2t 8 The court explicitly stated that in Arizona, a jury
does not make all of the findings necessary to expose the defendant to the
death penalty.2 19 Rather, the Arizona Supreme Court agreed wholeheartedly
with the Apprendi dissent and Justice O'Connor's characterization of
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme. 220 The court specified that:
In Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death solely on the basis of
a jury's verdict, regardless of the jury's factual findings. The range
of punishment allowed by law on the basis of the verdict alone is
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole or imprisonment for
,natural life' without the possibility of release. It is only after a
subsequent adversarial sentencing hearing, at which the judge alone
acts as the finder of the necessary statutory factual elements, that a
defendant may be sentenced to death .... And even then a death
sentence may not legally be imposed by the trial judge unless at
least one aggravating factor is found to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt.2
21
Clearly, the Arizona Supreme Court's characterization of the State's
capital sentencing scheme comported with Justice O'Connor's Apprendi
dissent: a finding, by a judge, of at least one aggravating factor is necessary
to expose the defendant to a possible maximum sentence of death.222
Recognizing that the United States Supreme Court did not overrule Walton
in its Apprendi opinion, and acknowledging that the Supremacy Clause
bound them to the Supreme Court's precedent, the Arizona Supreme Court
affirmed Ring's death sentence. 223
V. COLLISION: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN RING
Recognizing that the Court's opinion in Apprendi was irreconcilable
218. Id. at 1150-53.
219. Id. at 1152.
220. Id. at 1151. Justice O'Connor had characterized the Arizona scheme and the impact of the
Court's Apprendi decision as follows:
A defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence
unless a judge makes the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists.
Without that critical finding, the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is
life imprisonment, and not the death penalty .... If the Court does not intend to overrule
Walton, one would be hard pressed to tell from the opinion it issues today.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 538 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1151.
222. Compare Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619-21 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(reiterating her dissent from Apprendi, Justice O'Connor argued largely that Apprendi was decided
incorrectly), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing vehemently with
the majority's characterization of the Arizona scheme), and State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1152
(characterizing Arizona's death qualification process exactly as Justice O'Connor had in her
Apprendi dissent).
223. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1152.
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with Walton, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2 In doing
so, the Court found itself faced with contradictory precedents.2 5 On the one
hand, it had upheld the Arizona capital punishment scheme only twelve
years earlier in Walton.226 On the other hand, Apprendi dictated that a
defendant could not face an increase in the maximum allowable penalty
without a jury determination of the facts necessary to invoke the increased
penalty.
227
The Ring Court first noted that the Arizona Supreme Court's
characterization of its state's law is authoritative. 28  This principal, first
announced in Mullaney,229 meant that the Court, in deciding Ring's appeal,
would construe the Arizona sentencing system as the Arizona Supreme
Court had in State v. Ring.230  Thus, the majority abandoned its own
characterization of the Arizona scheme from Apprendi and adopted that of
the Apprendi dissent and the Arizona Supreme Court.2 31 The Arizona court
stated, as Justice O'Connor had in her Apprendi dissent, that a capital
defendant was not eligible for death unless the court found at least one
aggravating factor.232 This interpretation meant that without such a finding
made by a judge, the Arizona trial court could not sentence Ring to death,
only life imprisonment.233
The aggravating factors found by the judge subjected Ring to an
increased potential sentence, exactly the situation that Apprendi
precluded.13 4  Faced with the inevitability of overturning one of the two
precedents, the Court chose to extend Apprendi and overrule Walton.235 In
doing so, the majority relied almost exclusively on the reasoning of its
previous decisions in Jones and Apprendi.236
The Court turned to Apprendi's instruction that the legislature's
classification of a fact or circumstance as either an element or a sentencing
factor is not dispositive. 237 Rather, the function of the fact at issue, whether
224. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608-09 (stating that "Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence cannot be home to both"); Ring v. Arizona, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002)
(granting certiorari).
225. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
226. See generally Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
227. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000).
228. Ring, 536 U.S. at 603 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)).
229. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691.
230. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 603-04; 25 P.3d 1139 (2001).
231. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 603-04; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 536-40 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); State
v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1139.
232. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1150.
233. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 591-93.
234. Id. at 602-05.
235. Id. at 608-09.
236. Id. at 600-09.
237. Id. at 604-05; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470-71.
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it raises the range of penalties facing the defendant, is the proper inquiry.238
As Arizona's highest court properly characterized, the scheme provided that
a defendant was subject to death only after a finding of at least one
aggravating factor.2 39  Therefore, under Apprendi, Arizona's aggravating
factors functioned as elements of the offense, "raising the ceiling" on the
defendant and subjecting him to increased peril, in this case death, thereby
requiring the State to submit those facts to a jury and prove their existence
beyond a reasonable doubt.24 °
Using Apprendi as primary support, the Supreme Court found Arizona's
capital sentencing statute unconstitutional because it violated the Sixth
Amendment. 24 1 The Court overruled its holding in Walton "to the extent that
it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating
circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. 242 Ring thereby
extended Apprendi to apply to capital sentencing cases, mandating that the
Sixth Amendment applies to any determination, other than a prior
conviction, necessary to increase a defendant's maximum sentence. 43
The Court's reasoning and use of Apprendi and Jones was sound.24
The inherent weakness of the majority's position in using Apprendi and
Jones to overrule Walton rested in the closing paragraph of the Apprendi
majority opinion.245 New Jersey had based one of its arguments in Apprendi
on the Court's precedents in the area of capital sentencing jurisprudence,
namely the Hildwin, Spaziano, and Walton line of case law. 2 6 New Jersey
argued that because Walton upheld a sentencing scheme, that of Arizona,
which allowed a judge to determine facts necessary to subject a defendant to
the increased penalty of death rather than life imprisonment, the New Jersey
statute should pass constitutional muster because it allowed a judge to make
the factual determinations necessary to increase a defendant's potential
sentence by a few years.247
The Apprendi Court had expressly distinguished Walton and the other
capital sentencing cases based on an erroneous characterization of capital
sentencing procedures in Arizona.248 Without that distinction, the Apprendi
majority would have faced a dilemma; either overturn Walton or refuse to
decide Apprendi in the manner it did.249 Justice O'Connor fervently
238. Ring, 536 U.S. at 602-05 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495).
239. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 2001).
240. Ring, 536 U.S. at 600-09; see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478-84.
241. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 588.
244. See id. at 600-08.
245. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97 (distinguishing Walton along with the Court's recent line
of Eighth Amendment capital cases, including Hildwin and Spaziano).
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. See id. (rejecting the argument that Apprendi invalidated some death penalty schemes); State
v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1150-52 (Ariz. 2001) (validating the Apprendi dissent's portrayal of
Arizona's procedure).
249. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495-97; id. at 536-42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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highlighted this error in the Apprendi dissent, which astutely argued that by
its erroneous distinction, the majority was simply sidestepping precedent to
arrive at their predetermined destination: an increase in Sixth Amendment
protections at great expense and trouble to the court system.
2 5 0
The Apprendi dissent argued that the majority should either face the
inconsistency directly and overrule Walton, or stick to precedent and decide
in favor of New Jersey.2 5 ' In the end, the Apprendi dissent was ostensibly
correct, a fact proven when the Court backtracked on its distinction of
Walton only two years later when faced with Ring.252 When confronted with
that inconsistency, the majority adopted the Apprendi dissent's reasoning in
order to overrule Walton, using Apprendi as chief authority, a case which
they had explicitly distinguished only two terms earlier.253
Despite this apparent logical failing, Ring's rationale remains
defensible.254  First, significant differences existed between the Sixth
Amendment ideology during the Walton period and contemporary thought
on Sixth Amendment protections for sentencing proceedings. 255 As Justice
Scalia pointed out in his Ring concurrence, the issue in Walton was not as
tightly delineated as it was in Ring. 6 Walton had addressed the issue from
an Eighth Amendment perspective, while Ring clarified the issue as one of
Sixth Amendment import.
257
Justice Scalia emphasized this point when he expressed his conviction
that the American people's "traditional belief in the right of trial by jury is in
perilous decline," and that the decline would only accelerate should they
witness "the repeated spectacle of a man's going to his death because a
judge found that an aggravating factor existed. ' 258 Justice Scalia reasoned
that, "[w]e cannot preserve our veneration for the protection of the jury in
criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the need for that protection
by regularly imposing the death penalty without it."'259 That statement alone
marked a substantial change not only in Justice Scalia's constitutional
awareness, but of the contemporary climate as well. 2 °
250. ld. at 536-54.
251. Id.
252. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602-09 (2002).
253. Id.
254. See id. at 588-609.
255. See id. at 611-12 (Scalia, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia pointed
out the "accelerating propensity of both state and federal legislatures to adopt 'sentencing factors'
determined by judges that increase punishment beyond what is authorized by the jury's verdict" in
the 12 years leading up to Ring. Id.
256. Id. at 610-11.
257. Compare Ring, 536 U.S. 584, with Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
258. Ring. 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
259. Id.
260. See id. at 610-14 (Scalia, J., concurring). In his Ring concurrence, Justice Scalia noted that
since Walton he has "acquired new wisdom" or, more precisely, has "discarded old ignorance"
The Court's decision in Ring found added support in the fact that the
Court lacked adequate precedent in the area of Sixth Amendment capital
sentencing decisions at the time the Court decided Walton.26' The Court
based Walton largely on Proffitt, Hildwin, and Spaziano, cases decided
primarily based upon the Eighth Amendment, each of which is easily
distinguishable from the fundamental issue of Ring.262
Proffitt dealt specifically with jury sentencing, not jury adjudication of
facts necessary to engage in sentencing, as was the issue in Ring.263 The
Spaziano Court tackled the issue of judicial override in capital sentencing.2 4
However, the Spaziano Court stuck to the issue of jury sentencing, never
resolving the issue of whether a judge could override a jury's advisory
sentence where the jury had failed to find an aggravating factor.265 Hildwin
also addressed Florida's method of allowing judicial override of an advisory
sentence.266 However, in Hildwin the jury recommended death, indicating
that they did in fact find at least one aggravating factor.267
In addition to the distinctions mentioned above regarding Eighth
Amendment precedent available to the Walton Court, the Sixth Amendment
cases available at the time of Walton were decidedly different from the issue
confronted in Apprendi and Ring.268 By the time the Court heard Apprendi,
involving the impact of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it pertains to the
aggravating factors involved in capital sentencing. Id.
261. In 1990, the Walton Court faced a challenge to the Arizona statute based primarily on Eighth
Amendment grounds. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). At that time the Court lacked
the reasoning present in Jones and Apprendi that placed the Arizona statute in a Sixth Amendment
context, thus making the Ring decision possible. Compare id at 639 (placing the issue in an Eighth
Amendment rather than a Sixth Amendment context), with Ring, 536 U.S. 584 (extending Apprendi
and Jones to capital sentencing), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (extending the
Jones rule to state laws), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (holding that the
prosecution must submit factors which raise the potential maximum sentence to a jury).
262. See generally Walton, 497 U.S. at 639 (relying on Hildwin, Spaziano, and Proffitt in
upholding Arizona's scheme); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (dealing with a situation
where the jury's advisory verdict called for death, thus implying a finding of at least one aggravating
factor); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (failing to resolve the issue of whether a judge may
override a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment where the jury failed to find the existence of
at least one death-qualifying factor); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (finding that jury
sentencing was not necessary, but failing to directly address the issue of jury fact-finding in order to
qualify a defendant for death).
263. Compare Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-254, with Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
264. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 449-67.
265. See id.
266. See Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 638.
267. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 638-40; see Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 250-51 (1999)
(discussing Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 638-40). The Jones Court stated that "Hildwin could not drive the
answer to the Sixth Amendment question" because there, "a jury made a sentencing recommendation
of death, thus necessarily engaging in the factfinding required for imposition of a higher sentence,
that is, the determination that at least one aggravating factor had been proved." Jones, 526 U.S. at
250-51.
268. See generally McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (confronting mandatory
minimum sentences rather than an increase in the maximum penalty allowed by the jury's verdict);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (focusing on the burden of proving affirmative
defenses); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (discussing elements of an offense versus
sentencing factors).
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Sixth Amendment jurisprudence had developed substantially, especially
with respect to the particular issue in that case and the capital sentencing
issue faced in Ring.269 The primary precedents available at the time of
Walton, principally Patterson and McMillan, focused on distinctly disparate
issues than those in Apprendi.27 ° Patterson focused on affirmative defenses,
holding that the burden to prove them rested with the defendant once the
State met its burden of proof on guilt.27' In contrast, Apprendi and Ring
concentrated on the State's burden to prove basic facts necessary to impose a
272particular sentence.
The issue in McMillan, while more analogous to Apprendi and Ring
than was Patterson, remains easily distinguishable.2 7 3 The McMillan Court
confronted the subject of mandatory minimum sentences, not an increased
maximum as in Ring and Apprendi.274  The difference becomes more
relevant when one considers that the augmentation in the potential maximum
addressed in Ring was an increase from life imprisonment to the irrevocable
deprivation of a person's life.275  Certainly, the difference between
enhancing a sentence to a mandatory minimum term of years within the
statutorily prescribed range and an enhancement that deprives an individual
of his or her most valuable asset, life, is obvious.2 7 6  The Ring Court
269. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (specifically discussing the constitutionality
of increased maximum sentences without a jury's verdict authorizing the increased sentence);
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (distinguishing recidivism from other
types of enhancements).
270. Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (contemplating the necessity of jury
determination of facts necessary to expose a defendant to a particular sentencing range), with
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79 (focusing on the issue of mandatory minimum sentences), and Patterson,
432 U.S. at 197 (concentrating on the burden to prove an affirmative defense).
271. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210-15.
272. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597-99 (2002) (deciding that when the presence of
certain factors are necessary to impose a death sentence, the defendant possesses the right to have a
jury determine whether those factors exist); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (requiring that any fact which
increased the maximum penalty allowable for a crime be "charged in an indictment, submitted to a
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt") (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6).
273. McMillan dealt with mandatory minimum sentences triggered by certain factors while both
Ring and Apprendi addressed factors that prompted an increase in the maximum possible penalty.
Compare McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79, with Ring, 536 U.S. at 584, and Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466.
274. Compare McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79, with Ring, 536 U.S. at 597-98, and Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 468-69.
275. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 588-89.
276. Justice Kennedy recognized the difference between a deprivation of liberty and a deprivation
of life: "[i]f it is constitutionally impermissible to allow a judge's finding to increase the maximum
punishment for carjacking by 10 years, it is not clear why a judge's finding may increase the
maximum punishment for murder from imprisonment to death." Jones, 526 U.S. at 272 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). The majority in Apprendi distinguished between factors that required the imposition
of a mandatory minimum within the statutory range and factors that raised the possible maximum
sentence. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-95. The Ring Court then recognized that "[t]he right to trial by
jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the
factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding
necessary to put him to death." Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
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recognized this distinction while acknowledging that because "death is
different," a capital defendant deserves the utmost constitutional
277
protection.
The particular case of Timothy Stuart Ring aptly demonstrated the
rationale for providing the most stringent safeguards.278 In fact, Timothy
Stuart Ring displayed the worst-case scenario for sentencing regimes such as
that employed by Arizona because his case illustrated the manner in which
those regimes denied defendants their fundamental constitutional
protections. 279 The jury failed to find Ring guilty of premeditated murder,
instead finding him guilty of felony murder.280 The Arizona Supreme Court
specified that the evidence admitted during the trial phase "failed to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Ring] was a major participant in the armed
robbery or that he actually murdered [the victim]." '28  The Arizona court
noted that the trial evidence failed to adequately demonstrate Ring's
participation in the crime or its planning.
282
According to the Eighth Amendment protections iterated in Enmond and
Tison, the court could not sentence Ring to death without finding that he
actively participated in the crime.283 The trial judge, acting alone and at the
sentencing phase, made the requisite findings and did so based on evidence
that the jury never heard, the testimony of a co-conspirator. Even then,
the court could not impose a death sentence on Timothy Ring until the judge
made further findings.285
Again acting on evidence never introduced at trial, and based upon the
testimony of a witness neither seen nor heard by the jury, the judge
determined that two aggravating factors existed. 86 In doing so, the court
clearly denied Ring the right to a jury determination of facts necessary to
execute him.287 This case may have been different had the judge used only
facts presented at trial because in Ring's case the jury's findings and the
facts on which they were based were insufficient to permit a death
277. Ring, 536 U.S. at 605-06.
278. See id. at 588-97.
279. See id. at 588-97, 606-09.
280. Id. at 591-92.
281. Id. at 591 (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (2001)).
282. Ring, 536 U.S. at 591-92.
283. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 145, 158 (1987) (holding that major participation in a crime
leading to a felony murder conviction, coupled "with reckless indifference to human life is sufficient
to satisfy the Eninund culpability requirement" and impose the death penalty); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that a defendant could not receive the death penalty because he
did not kill, attempt to kill, or contemplate that death would occur in the commission of a robbery
during which an accomplice committed the actual killing).
284. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592-95.
285. In Arizona. a judge could not impose a death sentence without a finding of at least one
aggravating factor. ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version
at ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2002); Ring, 536 U.S. at 591-95.
286. Ring, 536 U.S. at 593-95. The judge found that Timothy Ring had committed the murder in
"'expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value"' and "'in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner."' Id. (quoting the transcript of Ring's sentencing hearing).
287. See id. at 595-97, 609.
550
[Vol. 31: 519, 2004] The Sixth and Eighth Amendments Collide
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sentence.288 Scenarios such as this are feasible in a scheme such as
Arizona's, where a state may execute a person based on facts never heard or
seen by his or her peers but rather adjudicated entirely by a judge.28 9 The
Sixth Amendment appears designed to safeguard against precisely such a
situation.29°
As part of its decision, the Court addressed the relationship between its
requirements of aggravating factors, per the Court's Furman and Gregg
decisions, and the rule decided in Ring compelling the State to submit those
constitutionally necessary facts to a jury.29' The State of Arizona argued
that, "[s]tates have constructed elaborate sentencing procedures in death
cases ... because of constraints [the Supreme Court has] said the Eighth
Amendment places on capital sentencing. 292  The Court dismissed the
argument that because the Supreme Court had interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to require certain procedural protections for capital defendants,
the states were somehow entitled to increased flexibility under the Sixth
Amendment as compensation by stating:
In various settings, we have interpreted the Constitution to require
the addition of an element or elements to the definition of a criminal
offense in order to narrow its scope .... If a legislature responded
to one of [those] decisions by adding the element we held
constitutionally required, surely the Sixth Amendment guarantee
would apply to that element. We see no reason to differentiate
capital crimes from all others in this regard.293
288. Id. at 588-93.
289. See id. at 602-08.
290. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring):
[Tihe fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all
facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives-
whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-
must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
291. Ring, 536 U.S. at 604-08; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
292. Id. at 606; see also Brief for Respondent at 21-25, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (No.
0 1-488), available at 2002 WL 481144 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
293. Ring, 536 U.S. at 606-07; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 539 (2000)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the notion "that the Eighth Amendment's restriction on a
state legislature's ability to define capital crimes should be compensated for by permitting States
more leeway under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in proving an aggravating fact necessary to a
capital sentence ... is without precedent in our constitutional jurisprudence"). For examples of
decisions in which the Court has found Constitutionally required elements, see United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (suggesting that the addition to the federal gun possession
statute of an "express jurisdictional element" requiring a connection between the weapon and
interstate commerce would render the statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (prohibiting states from proscribing "advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
This argument makes particular sense in the context of capital
sentencing.294 The Constitution provides numerous protections for criminal
defendants within the first eight amendments. 29' Among them are the right
to remain silent,296 the right to counsel,297 the freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment, 298 and the right to a jury trial.299  The criminal
defendant is not restricted to exercising these rights one at a time; rather, as
the Ring majority aptly pointed out, he or she may exercise many of them
simultaneously.30 ° Therefore, the Court properly stated that simply because
Furman and Gregg dictated that the Eighth Amendment requires certain
procedural safeguards in guiding a capital sentencer's discretion, that
protection does not preclude the defendant from also exercising his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial in applying those protections.3 1
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia addressed the interplay between
Furman's Eighth Amendment mandate and the Sixth Amendment
protections announced by the Ring majority.30 2 Justice Scalia voiced his
opinion that the Court erred in the Furman line by mandating aggravating
factors.30 3 However, Justice Scalia nevertheless supported the rationale of
the Ring majority because:
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"); Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (requiring actual knowledge or the probability of knowledge of a duty to
register on the part of a felon before the defendant can be convicted of failing to register in a
municipality).
294. The Court's decisions in Furman and Gregg interpreted the Eighth Amendment as requiring
that jurisdictions wishing to implement capital punishment include factors to guide the discretion of
the sentencing authority. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976); Furman, 408 U.S. at
255-57 (Douglas, J. concurring); WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4-5 (1991). The Ring Court
indicated that if the Eighth Amendment required the presence of a specific element in order to
impose a particular punishment, the defendant would nonetheless maintain his full Sixth
Amendment rights with regard to that element. Ring, 536 U.S. at 604-08.
295. See U.S. CONST. amend. I-VIII.
296. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
297. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
298. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
299. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
300. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604-08 (2002). The majority cited numerous occasions on
which they interpreted the Constitution to provide certain procedural safeguards, all of which are
subject to Sixth Amendment protection. Ring, 536 U.S. at 606-07 (citing United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561-562 (1995) (suggesting that the addition to a federal gun possession statute of an
"express jurisdictional element" requiring a connection between the weapon and interstate
commerce would render the statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause)); Brandenberg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (First Amendment prohibits states from "proscribing
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"); Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment requires
"actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge" before ex-
felon may be convicted of failing to register presence in municipality)).
301. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
302. Id. at 610-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
303. Id. at 610-11 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls
them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-
must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.3°
Justice Scalia further supported the Court's decision, despite his
sentiment that the Constitution does not require aggravating factors in
capital sentencing, based on the fact that:
We cannot preserve our veneration for the protection of the jury in
criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the need for that
protection by regularly imposing the death penalty without it.
Accordingly, whether or not the States have been erroneously
coerced into the adoption of "aggravating factors," wherever those
factors exist they must be subject to the usual requirements of the
common law, and to the requirement enshrined in our Constitution,
in criminal cases: they must be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.30 5
On a note of great importance in interpreting Ring's impact on states
allowing capital punishment, Justice Scalia added:
What today's decision says is that the jury must find the existence
of the fact that an aggravating factor existed. Those States that
leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue
to do so - by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in
the sentencing phase or, more simply, by placing the aggravating-
factor determination (where it logically belongs anyway) in the guilt
phase.3 °6
Justice Scalia's characterization of the significance of Ring indicated
that states need not require jury sentencing. °7 Justice Scalia also announced
that those states allowing a judge to override a jury's advisory verdict "may
continue to do so," as long as the jury makes the initial finding required to
impose a death sentence.
30 8
304. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
305. Id. at 610-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
307. Id. at 611-12. This portion of Justice Scalia's concurrence addressed the argument that the
Constitution required jury sentencing, an argument advanced by Justice Breyer in his concurring
opinion. Id. at 611-12, 614-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
553
Justice O'Connor kept her dissent in Ring short, deferring primarily to
her dissent in Apprendi.30 9 This was largely appropriate considering that
Justice O'Connor possessed the foresight to properly characterize the
Arizona capital sentencing scheme in her Apprendi dissent and likely
anticipated the Court's decision to overrule Walton based on the logic and
precedent of Apprendi.310 As discussed earlier, the Arizona Supreme Court,
the highest court from the state in which Justice O'Connor once served as an
appellate justice, vindicated the dissent's portrayal of the Arizona capital
sentencing scheme.31'
The dissent reiterated its stance that the Court's decision in Apprendi,
and now the Court's decision in Ring, contradicted the precedent of
Patterson and Almendarez-Torres.312 This argument certainly holds some
merit as all three cases dealt with sentencing issues in the context of
aggravating factors. 3 13 However, Almendarez-Torres dealt with recidivism
as an aggravating factor, while the issue presented in Ring was that of
findings of fact not protected by previous due process safeguards.3 14 As the
majority in both Jones and Apprendi pointed out, prior convictions, by their
very nature, already contain the essential requisite constitutional
protections. 315  As discussed earlier, the issue in Patterson regarded on
whom the burden of proof rested for affirmative defenses.316 Ring is clearly
distinguishable because there the issue was the burden of proving
affirmative facts necessary to subject a defendant to a particular sentence, in
Ring's case, the ultimate sentence of death.3 17
The dissent then demonstrated the destabilizing effect of Apprendi on
the criminal justice system since its pronouncement.3 18 The dissent argued
that the Court's decision in Ring would continue that destabilization by
rendering five sentencing schemes unconstitutional and casting doubt on the
schemes of four others. 319 The appeals generated, and the ensuing costs,
would envelop the courts.3 2 0 While the dissent's argument in this regard is
309. See id. at 619-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
310. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523-54 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
311. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1150-52 (Ariz. 2001). Justice O'Connor served in the Arizona
State Senate; as a Superior Court Judge in Maricopa County, Arizona, the same county in which the
original Ring trial took place, and later as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals. ROBERT W.
VAN SICKEL, NOT A PARTICULARLY DIFFERENT VOICE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SANDRA DAY
O'CONNOR 28-32 (1998).
312. Ring, 536 U.S. at 619-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 584, 588-609 (dealing with sentencing in capital cases); Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 227 (1999) (focusing on recidivism as a sentencing enhancement); Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 466 (1977) (addressing placement of the burden of proof in criminal cases).
314. See Ring, 536 U.S. 584; Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
315. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
316. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
317. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 602-04.
318. Id. at 619-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor quoted statistics that showed
1802 criminal appeals under the Apprendi doctrine in just two years. Id. at 620. Justice O'Connor
also noted a rise of 77% in second or successive habeas corpus petitions filed in federal court. Id.
319. Id. at 619-21.
320. Id.
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somewhat persuasive, the gravity of the situation unmistakably outweighs
the potential cost in terms of money and time to the criminal justice
system.321  Capital punishment deals not only with death, but also with life,
or more accurately, with many lives.322 One must closely contemplate the
logic of an argument that would weigh the cost of many lives, or even a
single life, against the potential burden upon the court system of providing
safeguards against arbitrary, vindictive, or erroneous decisions in sentencing
a person to die.
VI. OUT OF THE WRECKAGE: THE IMPACT OF RING V. ARIZONA
Thirty-eight states currently employ capital punishment as part of their
criminal justice systems, housing more than 3500 inmates on death row as of
January of 2002.323 In addition, both the federal government and the United
States military utilize capital punishment.324 Before Ring, of the thirty-eight
capital punishment states, eleven employed a sentencing procedure
providing, to some degree, for judicial findings of fact in capital
sentencing. 325 Five states, including Arizona, vested sole authority in the
judge to determine the existence of aggravating factors necessary to expose a
defendant to a death sentence.326 Four states utilized a hybrid system in
32 1. The majority confirmed its holding in Jones that the Sixth Amendment protects defendants
from an increase in years without a jury determination of facts. Id. at 600-01. Because capital
punishment involves the deprivation of life, the stakes are considerably higher in capital sentencing
than in any other type of punishment, and the capital defendant must be afforded at least the same
protection as those charged with lesser offenses. See id. at 606-10.
322. The Department of Justice reported that the United States death row population at the end of
2001 was 3,581 inmates from thirty-seven states and federal prisons. U.S. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdt/cp0l.pdf (last visited
October 20, 2003).
323. Id.. Of these states, 36 currently house death row inmates. Id. New Hampshire does not
have anyone on death row. Id. In January of 2003, Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted the
sentences of every inmate on Illinois' death row to lesser sentences. Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of
Fairness, Governor Clears out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, January 12, 2003, at A 1.
324. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp0I.pdf (last visited October 20, 2003).
325. See Brief for Amici Curiae Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York District Attorney's Association, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, in support of Respondent, at 9-10, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002) (No. 01-488), available at 2002 WL 481140 (indicating that nine states, Alabama, Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, and Nebraska, employ schemes put in peril
by the Court's Ring decision due to their use of judicial fact-finding). In addition to the
aforementioned nine states, Ring called into question the capital sentencing procedures of Nevada
and Missouri due to those states' use of judicial fact-finding in cases of jury deadlock. State v.
Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2002).
326. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6; see also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703(C)-(F) (West 2001)
(amended 2002) (current version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703(C)-(F)) (West Supp. 2002);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2515(a)-(c) (Michie 1997)
(amended 2003) (current version at IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2515(a)-(c) (2003)); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
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which the jury rendered an advisory sentence and the sentencing judge
possessed the authority to override the jury's recommendation.327 Two other
states provided for judicial fact-finding in cases where the jury deadlocked
as to the existence of aggravating factors.328 At the very least, Ring
impacted these eleven states, more than one-fourth of the capital punishment
states.329
A. The Initial Damage Report: Capital Punishment in States Providing for
Judicial Findings of Fact
1. Overview of the Schemes Identical to That of Arizona
In Arizona once a jury found the capital defendant guilty, a judge
presided alone at a sentencing hearing "to determine the existence or
nonexistence" of aggravating factors.33 ° The statute dictated that the court
"shall impose a sentence of death if the court finds one or more of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection G ... and that there are
no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
331
46-18-301(1), 46-18-305 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-2520, 2521, 2522 (Michie 1995)
(amended 2002) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-2520, 2521, 2522) (2003)).
327. Ring, 536 at 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46(a)-(f), 13A-5-47
(1994) (amended 2002) (current version at ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46(a)-(f); 13A-5-47 (2002)); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (2001) (amended 2002) (current version at 2003 Delaware Laws Ch. 174
(H.B. 287)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(l)-(3) (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West
2001) (amended 2002) (current version at IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9) (West Supp. 2002)).
328. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030(4) (2002) (amended 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554, 556 (2002)
(amended 2003) (current version at 2003 Nevada Laws Ch. 336 (A.B. 13)).
329. Ring, 536 U.S. at 584; see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46, 47 (2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-703 (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West
Supp. 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West Supp. 2002)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 4209 (2001)
(amended 2002) (current version at 2003 Delaware Laws Ch. 174 (H.B. 287)); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141 (West 2002); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997) (amended 2003) (current version at
IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2515(a)-(c) (2003)); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West 2001) (amended 2002)
(current version at IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9) (West Supp. 2002)); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4
(2002) (amended 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301, 305 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-
2520, 2521, 2522 (2001) (amended 2002) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-2520,
2521, 2522) (West Supp. 2002)); NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554, 556 (2002) (amended 2003) (current
version at 2003 Nevada Laws Ch. 336 (A.B. 13)); see also State v. Jones, 49 P.3d 273 (Ariz. 2002)
(recognizing Ring's effect on Arizona's sentencing procedure); Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo.
2003) (recognizing that Ring rendered Colorado's method of allowing a three-judge panel to
determine the presence of aggravating factors unconstitutional); State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d 874, 875
(Idaho 2002) (stating that Ring appeared to "invalidate the death penalty scheme in Idaho which to
this time has allowed the sentencing judge to make factual findings of the aggravating factors
necessary to the imposition of a death sentence."); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc) (finding the portion of Missouri's capital sentencing procedure allowing a judge to
determine the existence of aggravating factors in the instance of jury deadlock unconstitutional);
Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2002) (finding the portion of Nevada's capital sentencing
procedure allowing a judge to determine the existence of aggravating factors in the instance of jury
deadlock unconstitutional).
330. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 2002)).
331. Id. § 13-703(F).
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Thus, under the Arizona scheme before Ring, a capital defendant could not
face a sentence of death unless the trial judge made a factual finding of at
least one aggravating factor.332
The capital punishment systems of Nebraska, Idaho, and Montana were
effectively identical to that of Arizona.33 3 Each state required that, after a
finding of guilt, a judge preside over a separate sentencing hearing.334 At
that hearing the judge alone made the determination of whether any
aggravating factors existed. 3 5 Each of these schemes required the presence
of at least one aggravating factor in order for the state to impose a death
sentence.336
The Colorado capital punishment system was different only in that it
provided for a three-judge panel to determine the presence of the
aggravating factors.337 Colorado also required the presence of at least one
aggravating factor before the panel of judges could impose a death
sentence.338
332. Id.
333. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6 (stating that Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska "commit capital
sentencing factfinding... entirely to judges"). Compare ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West
2001) (amended 2002) (current version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2002)), with
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997) (amended 2003) (current version at IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2515
(2003)), and MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301, 305 (2001), and NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520, 2522
(2001) (amended 2002) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-2520, 2522) (2002)).
334. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997) (amended 2003) (current version at IDAHO CODE §
19-2525 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301, 305 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520, 2522
(2001) (amended 2002) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-2520, 2522) (2002))..
335. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997) (amended 2003) (current version at IDAHO CODE §
19-2515 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301, 305 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520, 2522
(2001) (amended 2002) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-2520, 2522) (2002)).
336. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (Michie 1997) (amended 2003) (current version at IDAHO CODE §
19-2515(c) (2003); State v. Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-
305 (2001); State v. McKenzie, 581 P.2d 1205 (Mont. 1978) (recognizing that the United States
Supreme Court has required states to prove at least one aggravating factor before imposing a death
sentence); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520, 2522 (2001) (amended 2002) (current version at NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 29-2520, 2522) (2002))..
337. Compare ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2002)), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103
(West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West Supp.
2002)).
338. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103(1)(d)(2)(b)(II)(A) (West 2001) (amended 2002)
(current version at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West Supp. 2002)).
2. The Consequences of Ring in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
and Nebraska
a. Arizona
Ring declared Arizona's scheme unconstitutional to the extent that it
allowed a judge to engage in the fact-finding required to determine the
existence of aggravating factors necessary to sentence a defendant to
death.339 In response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring,
the Arizona legislature revised section 703 of the criminal code to reflect the
constitutional limitations imposed by that decision.340  Arizona's scheme
now mandates that the trier of fact engage in the fact-finding necessary to
impose a capital sentence on a defendant. 34' If the trier of fact in the guilt
phase is a jury, that same jury must determine the existence of one or more
aggravating factors unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt and, if they
find at least one, the jury must decide the proper penalty.342
Because Arizona now requires a jury determination of those facts
necessary to the imposition of a capital sentence, its capital sentencing
scheme comports with Ring.343 However, Ring's effect on defendants
sentenced under the old scheme is not yet settled.344 The Arizona Supreme
Court has decided numerous Ring-based appeals, refusing to find that
application of the old system constituted harmless error, and remanding
cases for re-sentencing consistent with Ring.345 This ruling applies only to
cases with remaining available appeals, however.34 6 The Arizona court has
refused to apply Ring retroactively to defendants who have exhausted their
appeals. 347
b. Colorado
Because the Colorado system expressly required that an aggravating
factor exist prior to exposing the defendant to a death sentence, and because
the system provided that a panel of judges rather than a jury make that
finding, Ring rendered the Colorado system unconstitutional.348 In response,
339. Ring, 536 U.S. at 595. The Arizona Supreme Court recognized this fact in July of 2002.
State v. Smith, 50 P.3d 825, 830-31 (Ariz. 2002); State v. Jones, 49 P.3d 273, 284 (Ariz. 2002).
340. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01 (West 2002).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01 (West 2002); Ring, 536 U.S. at 584.
344. E.g., State v. Hoskins, 65 P.3d 953, 954-55 (Ariz. 2003) (remanding for re-sentencing due to
Ring); State v. Jones, 49 P.3d 273, 284 (Ariz. 2002) (remanding for re-sentencing due to Ring).
345. E.g., State v. Pandelli, 65 P.3d 950, 953 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Hoskins, 65 P.3d 953, 955
(Ariz. 2003); State v. Phillips, 67 P.3d 1228, 1232 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Finch, 68 P.3d 123, 126
(Ariz. 2003); State v. Lehr. 67 P.3d 703, 706 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Jones, 72 P.3d 1264 (Ariz. 2003).
346. See State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 830 (Ariz. 2003) ("We conclude that [Ring] does not apply
retroactively to final cases").
347. Id.
348. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 259 (Colo. 2003). The Ring dissent confirmed that Ring
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the Governor signed a bill enacted by the Colorado legislature designed to
bring the Colorado capital sentencing scheme into accordance with the Sixth
Amendment's requirements of trial by jury. 349  The new sentencing
procedure provides for a sentencing hearing at which a jury determines the
existence of aggravating factors before a court may sentence a defendant to
death.350
In February of 2003, the Colorado Supreme Court decided the direct
appeals of two men, William Woldt and Francisco Martinez, both
condemned to death under the old sentencing regime.35" ' The Colorado court
recognized that Ring rendered the previous capital sentencing system
unconstitutional.352  The court then reversed each man's sentence and
imposed terms of life without the possibility of parole upon both Martinez
and Woldt.353  This marked the first instance in which Ring's Sixth
Amendment mandate spared the life of a condemned individual.354
c. Idaho
In August of 2002, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the
implications of Ring to the Idaho capital sentencing scheme.355 Idaho's
highest court acknowledged that Ring appeared to "invalidate the death
penalty scheme in Idaho which to this time has allowed the sentencing judge
to make factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to the
imposition of a death sentence. 356 In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court
vacated the death sentences and remanded the cases consolidated before it to
the lower courts for re-sentencing in accordance with Ring.357 In response,
the Idaho Legislature passed a bill revising the state's capital sentencing
procedure.358 The change requires the court to hold a sentencing hearing
before a jury, which must find at least one aggravating factor before the
court may impose death upon the accused.359
declared the Colorado scheme unconstitutional. Ring, 536 U.S. at 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (2001) (amended 2002) (current version at COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (2002)).
349. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (2002).
350. Id.
351. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 258.
352. Id. at 259.
353. Id. at 272.
354. See id. at 259.
355. State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (Idaho 2002).
356. Id.
357. Id.




At the time Timothy Stewart Ring received his death sentence in the
state of Arizona, the language of Montana's capital sentencing scheme
seemed to state that no defendant may receive a sentence of death without a
finding of at least one statutory aggravating factor,360 and that a judge must
make such a finding.361 Montana has since amended its capital scheme to
comport with the Ring requirements that aggravating factors necessary for
imposition of a death sentence must be found by a jury.3 62  As of yet,
Montana's courts have released no ruling regarding Ring's impact on the six
inmates awaiting execution on that state's death row.363
e. Nebraska
In late 2002, Nebraska Governor Mike Johanns called a special session
of the state legislature to deal with the issues raised by Ring.364 A revision to
Nebraska Statute 29-2520 passed through the Nebraska legislature and
Governor Johanns signed the change into law in November of 2002.365 The
new scheme provides that after resolution of a defendant's guilt, unless the
defendant waives the right to a jury, the same jury that presided at trial must
determine whether one or more aggravating factors exist.366 Because the
new scheme provides for a jury's fact-finding on the matter of the
aggravating factors, Nebraska's capital sentencing system appears to
comport with Ring.367
In March of 2003, the Nebraska Supreme Court reacted to Ring when it
decided the appeal of Arthur L. Gales, a man found guilty of two counts of
first-degree murder and sentenced under the pre-Ring scheme.368 The Court
found that Ring had in fact rendered Nebraska's capital punishment scheme
unconstitutional and that application of the pre-Ring system did not
constitute harmless error.36 9  The Nebraska court vacated Gales' death
360. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2001); State v. McKenzie, 581 P.2d 1205, 1228 (Mont.
1978) (recogitizing that the United States Supreme Court has required states to prove at least one
aggravating factor before imposing a death sentence).
361. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301(l), 305 (2001); State v. Dawson, 761 P.2d 352, 360 (Mont.
1988) (holding that a defendant is not entitled to jury determination of aggravating factors because
they relate only to sentencing and were not elements of the crime).
362. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-401 (2002); 2003 Mont. Laws 154 § 1; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 620-21 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent stated, "The Court effectively declares
five States' capital sentencing schemes unconstitutional," identifying Montana as one of those five
states. Id.
363. As of June 2003. searches on Westlaw and LexisNexis returned no results for cases pending
or decided in Montana on Ring issues.
364. Robyn Tysver, Execution Bill Gets Final OK Lawmakers Go Home After an II -day Special
Session and Receive "Thank-yous" From the Governor, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 22, 2002, at
Ia.
365. Id.
366. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2519, 29-2520 (2002).
367. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2519, 29-2520 (2002); Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
368. State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 631-32 (Neb. 2003).
369. Id.
560
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sentences and remanded to the lower court with instructions to conduct a
new sentencing hearing in accord with Nebraska's new capital punishment
statute.370  However, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to apply Ring
retroactively to defendants whose final appeals had been exhausted,
suggesting that its ruling in Gales applies only to defendants with pending
cases.
371
B. Ring's Influence on States Employing "Hybrid Schemes"
1. Alabama
The Alabama system mandates that the court hold a sentencing hearing
before a jury, which returns an advisory verdict based on a majority vote in
the case of recommending life imprisonment, and must include the votes of
at least ten jurors if the verdict is for death. 372 The jury may not return a
verdict recommending death without a finding that at least one aggravating
circumstance exists.373  The court then conducts a sentencing
investigation.3 74 "[I]n deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall
determine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist
outweigh ... the mitigating circumstances., 375 The statute directs the court
to consider the jury's recommendation, but instructs that the
recommendation is not binding.
The Alabama scheme requires the presence of at least one aggravating
factor before sentencing a defendant to death. 377  The fact that the jury
recommendation is only advisory and a judge may override that
recommendation is not per se unconstitutional under Ring.378 However, the
statute suggests, and the case law supports, the proposition that the trial
court is the final arbiter of whether at least one aggravating factor exists.
37 9
370. Id.
371. State v. Lotter, 664 N.W.2d 892. 903-08 (Neb. 2003).
372. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(a)-(f) (2002).
373. Id. § 13A-5-46(e)(l).
374. Id. § 13A-5-47(e).
375. Id. (emphasis added).
376. Id.; Ex Parte Hays, 518 So. 2d 768, 777 (Ala. 1986) (finding that the trial judge is the final
sentencing authority and may override the jury's advisory sentence and impose a death sentence),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988).
377. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(1) (2002); Ex Parte Waldrop, No. 1001194, 2002 Ala. Lexis 336,
at *12-13 (Ala. Nov. 22, 2002) ("It is true that under Alabama law at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance under Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-49, must exist in order for a defendant convicted of a
capital offense to be sentenced to death."); see also Coral v. State, 585 So. 2d 248, 248-249 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991) (holding that the trial court must make specific written findings in order for the
court to uphold a death sentence).
378. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2002).
379. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (2002); Scott v. State, 728 So. 2d 164, 171-72 (Ala. Crim. App.
Ring invalidates any system in which a jury need not make the requisite
findings necessary to impose a death sentence, casting doubt upon the
portion of Alabama's code that allows a judge to override a jury's
recommendation of a life sentence in the instance that the jury failed to find
at least one aggravating factor.38 °
The Alabama courts have issued several decisions since Ring.38" '
Overall, Alabama has shown hesitance to read Ring as overruling the state's
sentencing system.382 Likewise, the state legislature is standing by the
Alabama court's interpretation of the state's scheme and the effect of
Ring.383 No doubt, in the future the Alabama scheme will face constitutional
challenges based on Ring.384
2. Delaware
Prior to Ring, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing before a
jury, which then returned an advisory verdict.385 The law required a finding
of at least one aggravating factor in order to expose a capital defendant to a
death sentence.386 The court polled the jury regarding its verdict, and asked
whether it found the existence of at least one aggravating factor.3 87  The
system allowed a judge to override the jury's verdict. 388 It is unclear from
the statutory language whether the judge could do so in a case where the jury
failed to find at least one aggravating factor.389
Ring cast significant doubt on the validity of Delaware's scheme, at
least to the extent that it allowed a court to sentence a defendant to death
without a unanimous jury determination that at least one aggravating factor
1997) (permitting a judge to override a jury's recommendation for mercy is not cruel and unusual
punishment); Hays, 518 So. 2d at 777 (finding that the trial judge is the final sentencing authority
and may override the jury's advisory sentence and impose a death sentence ).
380. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 620-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (casting doubt on Alabama's
scheme).
381. See, e.g., Ex Porte Waldrop, No.1001194, 2002 Ala. Lexis 336 (Ala. Nov. 22, 2002); Hale v.
State, 848 So. 2d 224 (Ala. 2002); Ex Parte Carroll, No. 1010546, 2002 Ala. Lexis 285 (Ala. Sept
20, 2002).
382. Waldrop, 2002 Ala. Lexis 336.
383. As of March, 2003, a search of Alabama's legislative sessions since Ring's release returns no
results for any pending legislation involving Ring-based alterations to the state's sentencing
procedures.
384. See Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the
Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1479 (2002) (stating that numerous questions raised by
Ring regarding the hybrid-scheme states, one of which is Alabama, "will be decided preliminarily in
the state courts and legislatures" as well as in federal courts).
385. DEL. CODE ANN. tit I1, § 4209(b) (2001) (amended 2003) (current version at 2003 Delaware
Laws Ch. 174 (H.B. 287)).
386. Id. § 4209(d); State v. Rodriguez, 656 A.2d 262, 274 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (specifying that
if the court fails to find at least one aggravating factor, the court may not impose a death sentence,
but must impose a sentence of natural life).
387. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 4209(c)(3) (2001).
388. See id. § 4209(d); Shelton v. State, 652 A.2d I, 15 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995) (recognizing that in
Delaware a defendant is not entitled to a jury trial with regard to sentencing); Wright v. State, 633
A.2d 329, 335 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (the jury's role is advisory).
389. See § 4209(d).
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existed.390 Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, expressed doubt as to Ring's
effect on Delaware's scheme.391 In July of 2002, a Delaware trial court put a
capital trial on hold pending a review of the Delaware capital statute.392
Delaware State Prosecutor Steven P. Wood expressed concern that it may
take months or years to determine whether Ring applies to Delaware,
voicing his concern that "'[i]f Justice O'Connor doesn't know if Ring
applies to Delaware, it's very difficult for the rest of us to answer that
question.'" 3 93
Recognizing that months or years of doubt cast upon their criminal
justice system might produce a severely destabilizing effect, the Delaware
legislature passed a bill intended to amend Delaware's code to reflect the
Sixth Amendment mandate of Ring.394 The new law requires that a
unanimous jury find at least one aggravating factor before a judge could
sentence a defendant to death.395  The law leaves the remainder of
Delaware's scheme unchanged.396  Delaware continues to allow a jury to
enter an advisory sentence and allow the judge to override that
recommendation, but only in the case that the jury entered a finding on the
existence of one or more aggravating factors.397
3. Indiana
Prior to Ring, Indiana employed a system very similar to that of
Delaware.398 Indiana's was a hybrid system in which the sentencing hearing
was held before a jury that rendered an advisory verdict.399 The defendant
could not receive a death sentence without a finding of at least one
aggravating factor. 40 The judge could override the jury's recommendation,
390. See id.; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
391. Ring, 536 U.S. at 620-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ( "I fear that the prisoners on death row
in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana, which the Court identifies as having hybrid sentencing
schemes in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing
determination, may also seize on today's decision to challenge their sentences.") (citation omitted).
392. Celia Cohen, Supreme Court Death Penalty Ruling Muddles Capano Murder Sentence, 5
DEL. L. WKLY. No. 29 (July 3, 2002).
393. Id. (quoting Steven P. Wood).




398. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9) (West Supp. 2002), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 4209 (2001) (amended
2003) (current version at 2003 Delaware Laws Ch. 174 (H.B. 287)).
399. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-9(d)-(e) (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9) (West Supp. 2002)).
400. Id. § 35-50-2-9(k); Wrinkles v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1156, 1171 (Ind. 1998) (finding that the
state is required to prove at least one aggravating factor prior to sentencing defendant to death).
and in the case that a jury was unable to reach a verdict, the court could
conduct the hearing on its own. a0
In anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision in Ring, the Indiana
legislature amended the state's pertinent code sections to reflect the Sixth
Amendment limitations imposed by the Court's decision.4 °2 The current
Indiana sentencing scheme provides for a jury determination of aggravating
circumstances and removes the potential for judicial override in the case that
the jury fails to so find.40 3
4. Florida
Before the Court's decision in Ring, a convicted capital defendant faced
a separate sentencing hearing in front of the same jury that heard the case. 404
That jury rendered an advisory sentence based in part upon "[w]hether
sufficient aggravating circumstances exist[ed] .... .405 The jury was not
required to arrive at this advisory verdict unanimously. 406 The court then,
"after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances," entered a
sentence of either life imprisonment or death.40 7 It bears repeating that the
jury's sentence was only advisory and the trial court could override the
jury's verdict and impose the sentence of its choosing.4 8
The key to Ring's impact on the Florida scheme is the jury's role.4 0 9 It
would seem that the advisory sentencing procedure passes constitutional
muster in the instances that the jury finds at least one aggravating
401. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(f) (West 2001) (amended 2002) (current version at IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-50-2-9) (West Supp. 2002)); Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Ind. 1983)
(specifying that the jury's recommendation is not binding on the trial court), cert. denied. 464 U.S.
1003 (1983).
402. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West 2002) (current version at IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9)
(West Supp. 2002)).
403. Id.
404. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West 2002).
405. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(a) (West 2002).
406. See James v. State, 453 So. 2d 786, 792 (Fla. 1984) (finding that jury unanimity is not
required by due process), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098 (1984).
407. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2002).
408. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362, 366 (Fla. 1994) (finding that the judge's
imposition of a death sentence over the jury's advisory verdict of life imprisonment was proper);
Christmas v. State, 632 So. 2d 1368, 1371 (Fla. 1994) (stating that only when facts suggesting a
sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ, may a
judge overrule the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and impose the death penalty);
Thomas v. State, 465 So. 2d 456, 460 (Fla. 1984) (stating that a sentence of death imposed by a
judge after the jury has recommended sentence of life imprisonment will be upheld if the facts
supporting sentence of death are clear and convincing).
409. The issue addressed by Ring involved a jury determination of facts necessary to permit a
death sentence. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-610 (2002). In Florida, imposition of a death
sentence necessitates the existence of at least one aggravating factor. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141
(West 2002). The Florida scheme allows a judge to override a jury's recommendation of life
imprisonment regardless of whether that jury found a single aggravating factor during either the guilt
or sentencing phases. Id.; Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362, 366 (Fla. 1994) (finding that the
judge's imposition of a death sentence over the jury's advisory verdict of life imprisonment was
proper).
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circumstance, regardless of that jury's recommendation.4 '0  Because the
Florida scheme requires at least one aggravating factor to be found before a
defendant may receive the death penalty, and because Ring requires that any
fact that exposes the defendant to increased peril must be found by a jury,
the Florida scheme must require that the jury find at least one aggravating
factor unanimously.4 1 1 After such a finding, the judge may sentence the
defendant as he or she sees fit, even if that sentence overrides the jury's
advisory sentence. 12
The Florida Supreme Court has since issued numerous decisions
regarding the Court's Ring holding, two of which are particularly
pertinent. 41 3  In King v. Moore4 14 and Bottoson v. Moore,4 15 released as
companion cases, the Florida high court upheld the Florida system stating
that the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly sustained Florida's
capital sentencing scheme in cases such as Hildwin and Spaziano.4 16
Therefore, the Florida court left the issue to the United States Supreme Court
to render a decision directly referring to Florida before the state court would
mandate alterations in Florida's procedure.41 7 However, one member of the
Florida court, Justice Pariente, expressed doubt regarding the viability of
Florida's system.4 18 In his concurrence Justice Pariente stated:
[T]he Ring decision creates uncertainty as to its effect-more so
because we now know that a majority of the United States Supreme
Court is seriously concerned about the implications for the Sixth
Amendment trial by jury when a judge and not a jury makes the
factual determinations that are prerequisites for an increased
penalty. In the context of a capital case, the stakes are the ultimate
because the increased penalty is death.41 9
Justice Pariente further recognized that Florida's system does not
provide for specific jury findings of aggravating factors; rather, it "requires
410. Ring merely requires that ajury make a determination of the existence of aggravating factors
rather than requiring jury sentencing. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
411. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2002); Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
412. See Ring, 536 U.S. 584. Ring does not require jury sentencing in capital cases, only a
determination of each factor necessary for imposition of the sentence with the exception of prior
convictions. Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
413. King v. Moore, 824 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2002); Bottoson v. Moore, 824 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2002)
(granting a stay of execution for filing of briefs and oral arguments), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1070
(2002).
414. 824 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2002).
415. 824 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2002).
416. See King, 824 So. 2d at 130-32 (Wells, J., dissenting); Bottoson, 824 So. 2d at 124-26 (Wells,
J., dissenting).
417. King, 824 So. 2d at 127; Bottoson, 824 So. 2d at 115.
418. Botoson, 824 So. 2d at 116-17 (Pariente, J., concurring).
419. Id. at 117 (Pariente, J., concurring).
the jury to render an 'advisory sentence' based on a balancing of
aggravating ... and mitigating factors. ' 420 He added, "The jury, however, is
not required to specify what, if any, aggravators it found.",
421
Justice Pariente recognized the constitutional problem this system raises,
"because Florida law does not require that any number of jurors agree that
the State has proven the existence of an aggravator before that aggravator
may be deemed to be found, it is questionable whether the jury has actually
found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a particular aggravator.,
422
Justice Pariente's concurring opinion noted that the United States Supreme
Court had previously failed to find a distinction between Florida's and
Arizona's sentencing schemes:
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Walton v.
Arizona, in concluding that Arizona's sentencing scheme was not
dissimilar to Florida's scheme: "The distinctions Walton attempts to
draw between the Florida and Arizona statutory schemes are not
persuasive. It is true that in Florida the jury recommends a
sentence, but it does not make factual findings with regard to the
existence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and its
recommendation is not binding on the trial judge.9423
Justice Pariente astutely realized the implications of this fact, stating,
"[t]hus, a substantial question is raised as to whether Florida's capital
scheme violates the holding in Ring. '424 Pariente also cast doubt upon the
Florida system because of the state's failure to require unanimity in jury
findings at capital sentencing hearings.42 5
In dissent, however, Justice Wells argued that the United States
Supreme Court's previous decisions regarding Florida's capital sentencing
system validated the constitutionality of that system, and that the Court's
denial of Bottoson's Ring-based appeal for certiorari confirmed that
contention.426 Due to the issues raised by the Florida Supreme Court and
due to the obvious split within that court itself, the constitutionality of
Florida's procedure remains in doubt.427
420. Id. at 120-21 (Pariente, J., concurring).
421. Id. at 120 (Pariente, J., concurring).
422. Id.
423. Id. (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)).
424. Bottoson, 824 So. 2d at 120 (Pariente, J., concurring).
425. id. at 120-21 (Pariente, J., concurring).
426. Id. at 123-25 (Wells, J., dissenting). Justice Wells relied heavily on the Court's decisions in
Hildwin and Spaziano, both of which vindicated the Florida sentencing scheme prior to Walton, and
on which the United States Supreme Court relied in deciding Walton, for support for his proposition
that the Court's jurisprudence vindicated Florida's sentencing scheme. Id.
427. See id. at 120-21 (Pariente, J., concurring); id. at 123-25 (Wells, J., dissenting).
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C. Ring's Effect on States Employing Judicial Fact-Finding in Cases of
Jury Deadlock
1. Nevada
Before the Court's decision in Ring, Nevada required the existence of at
least one aggravating factor before a court could impose a death sentence.428
Nevada's procedure conferred the authority to determine both the existence
of aggravating factors and the appropriate sentence to the jury at a separate
sentencing phase.429  However, in the case that the jury failed to reach a
unanimous verdict regarding the sentence, the statute directed the Nevada
Supreme Court to appoint a three-judge panel to make that determination.43 °
In December of 2002, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that the
procedure of allowing a judicial panel to resolve the issue of aggravating
factors was a constitutional infirmity under Ring.431  The Nevada court
vacated the death sentences of a convicted defendant because at the
sentencing phase, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and a
three-judge panel determined the existence of aggravating factors before
sentencing the defendant to death.432 However, the Nevada court took Ring
a step further.433 The court noted that in order to impose a death sentence,
the Nevada statute required that the "'jury or the panel of judges may impose
a sentence of death only if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and
further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to
outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.' 43 4 The
Nevada Supreme Court interpreted the Nevada capital sentencing statute as
requiring both a finding that an aggravating factor existed and that no
mitigating factors outweighed those aggravators found before a defendant
428. NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554 (2002) (amended 2003) (current version at 2003 Nevada Law Ch.
366 (A.B. 13)).
429. Id.; Hardison v. State, 763 P.2d 52 (Nev. 1988) (holding that once a jury has assessed a
penalty of death, the judge holds no discretion and must enter a judgment according to the verdict of
the jury).
430. NEV. REV. STAT. 175.556 (2002) (amended 2003) (current version at 2003 Nevada Laws Ch.
366 (A.B. 13)).
431. Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2002).
432. Id. at460-61.
433. Id. (noting that Ring abstained from ruling on "any Sixth Amendment claim with respect to
mitigating circumstances").
434. Id. at 460 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554(3) (2002)). The court also referred to Holloway
v. State, 6 P.3d 987 (Nev. 2000) for the proposition that
Under Nevada's capital sentencing scheme, two things are necessary before a defendant
is eligible for death: the jury must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that
at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance exists, and each juror must individually
consider the mitigating evidence and determine that any mitigating circumstances do not
outweigh the aggravating.
Johnson, 59 P.3d at 460 n.34 (quoting Holloway, 6 P.3d at 996).
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could receive a death sentence. 35 The court then interpreted Nevada's
procedure, in light of Ring, to indicate that because the statute necessitated
both findings in order to authorize an increase in the defendant's
punishment, a jury must make both findings.436 Therefore, according to the
Nevada Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson, Ring indicates that Nevada may
neither empanel three judges to make the determination of the existence of
aggravating factors, nor allow a three-judge panel to weigh the mitigating
factors against any aggravators found in order to determine the appropriate
sentence.43
2. Missouri
Prior to Ring, Missouri required that a jury find the presence of at least
one aggravating factor before a court could impose a death sentence.
438
However, in a case where the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict on
whether at least one aggravating factor existed, the Missouri statute allowed
the trial judge to make that determination.439 In June of 2003, the Missouri
Supreme Court recognized that Ring rendered that procedure
unconstitutional.440
In hearing the appeal of convicted murderer Joseph Whitfield, the
Missouri court recognized the similarity between the Missouri and Nevada
capital schemes. 44' The Whitfield court recognized that in Missouri, a capital
defendant could not receive a death sentence without a finding that at least
one aggravating factor existed." 2 The court then observed that because Ring
requires that a jury make that determination, judges are precluded from
making the requisite findings necessary to impose a capital sentence.
44 3
Accordingly, the Missouri court vacated Whitfield's death sentence and,
consistent with the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Woldt v.
People,444 and pursuant to Missouri statutory law, 44 5 re-sentenced Whitfield
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole." 6
435. Johnson, 59 P.3d at 460-61.
436. Id.
437. id. at 460-63.
438. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2002) (amended 2003).
439. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2002) (amended 2003).
440. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 261-62 (Mo. 2003).
441. Id. at 260-61.
442. Id. at 256-61.
443. Id. at 261-62.
444. Id. at 259-60 (recognizing the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Woldt v. People, 64
P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003) and the fact that the Colorado court chose to re-sentence the defendants to life
in prison without the possibility of parole).
445. Id. at 271-72. The Missouri Supreme Court claimed the authority to vacate Whitfield's
sentence under Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.040.2 (2002) and the authority to re-sentence the defendant
under Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.035.5(2) (2002).
446. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 272.
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The Missouri court also addressed the issue of retroactivity as it applied
to Whitfield and the State of Missouri in general." 7 The court determined
that according to Missouri law:
In the event that any death sentence imposed pursuant to [MO. REV.
STAT. 565.040] is held to be unconstitutional, the trial court which
previously sentenced the defendant to death shall cause the
defendant to be brought before the court and shall sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation,
parole, or release except by act of the governor ......
Thus, the Missouri court concluded that Missouri Law entitled capital
defendants to protection even in the event that they had exhausted their final
appeals.
449
D. The Immediate Future of Capital Punishment Under Ring
The Court's decision is one indication of the evolving cultural and social
attitudes concerning capital punishment.450  Blanket clemency in one state
and a public moratorium in another represent additional indications of that
shift, brought on in part by numerous cases of death-row exonerations,
instances of prosecutors suppressing evidence, and reduced availability of
habeas corpus relief for death row inmates as a result of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 4 5' The Court's decision in Ring
reflected the growing social cynicism regarding capital punishment and will
likely bolster death penalty foes to redouble their efforts to defeat capital
punishment.452 In addition to the potential social questions, Ring left several
legal questions in its wake.453
447. Id. at 264-71.
448. Id. at 271 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 565.040.2 (2002)).
449. Id.
450. Steiker, supra note 384, at 1482-83.
451. Id. at 1482-83.
452. Id. at 1483-84. The court stated:
The Court's decisions in Atkins and Ring do not merely reflect this trend in public
attitudes toward skepticism about the administration of capital punishment; to some
degree, of course, the Court's decisions reinforce this skepticism. While the Court's
decisions create new headaches and costs for states that wish to continue to administer
capital punishment, they also embolden abolitionist litigators to push further and
encourage federal court judges to consider challenges they might otherwise dismiss out of
hand).
453. See id. at 1481-82 (stating that litigation is needed to resolve the questions of whether
sentences imposed under pre-Ring schemes constitute harmless error and what effect Ring had on
judicial fact-finding in cases of jury deadlock). To some extent these questions have found answers
in post-Ring appeals. See State v. Pandelli, 65 P.3d 950, 953 (Ariz. 2003) (failing to find harmless
error in a Ring-based appeal); Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003) (finding reversible error
based on a Ring appeal and re-sentencing to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole);
569
The Court's ruling in Ring raised numerous issues for future legislation
and litigation.454  Because Ring amplified the procedural standards
constitutionally required in capital sentencing procedures, many states will
likely face challenges based on Ring's possible effect upon evidentiary rules
in those same procedures. 455 Also, one or more courts may choose to follow
Nevada's example in interpreting Ring to require a jury to render a finding
that the aggravating factors outweigh mitigating circumstances before
allowing imposition of a death sentence.456
The battle over Ring's scope is only beginning.457 In February of 2003,
Maryland's highest court granted a stay of execution in order to consider
Ring's impact on that state's capital sentencing procedure.45 8 Maryland law
requires that in order to permit a death sentence, a jury must find that the
aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating circumstances by a
preponderance of the evidence.4 5 9  The appeal argues that Ring requires a
heightened standard, that of beyond a reasonable doubt.
460
Furthermore, any State affected by Ring will no doubt endure numerous
challenges on Ring grounds. 46' The most important and perhaps the most
vague issue in these appeals may be retroactivity.462 Although argued in the
State's brief, Ring's majority failed to address retroactivity, and the dissent
mentioned it only briefly.463  Thus, that question remains unresolved. 4
Prospective appellants will broach retroactivity from one of many
approaches, depending on the status of their particular case.465
State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (finding that judicial fact-finding in cases of jury
deadlock violates the Sixth Amendment); Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 460-63 (Nev. 2002)
(finding that judicial fact-finding in cases of jury deadlock violates the Sixth Amendment).
454. Steiker, supra note 384, at 1477-82.
455. See id. at 1481-82. Fourteen states do not apply their usual rules of evidence to capital
sentencing proceedings. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(d) (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West
2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-302 (2002) (amended
2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-1101(4)(b) (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552.1 (2002);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(111) (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (West 2001);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.150(a)(1) (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-9-14(4) (Michie 2002); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(c) (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(b) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.060(3) (West 2002); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(c) (Michie 2002).
456. See Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 459 (Nev. 2002).
457. See Steiker, supra note 384, at 1480-82.
458. Stephanie Hanes, Maryland Court Delays Execution of Oken; White Marsh Killer's Case
Was First Under Ehrlich; A Postponement Until May, BALT. SUN, Feb. 12, 2003, at IA.
459. MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL § 2-302(h)(2) (2002).
460. Hanes, supra note 458.
461. See Steiker, supra note 384, at 1476-84.
462. See id. at 1478-81 (noting that the number of inmates that will be entitled to new hearings is
in question, and that every inmate in the five states that provided for judicial determination of
aggravating factors was sentenced to death in violation of Ring).
463. Brief for Respondent at 6, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (No. 0 1-488), available at
2002 WL 481144; see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 621 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I
believe many of these challenges will ultimately be unsuccessful ... because ... having completed
their direct appeals, they will be barred from taking advantage of today's holding on federal
collateral review.").
464. See generally Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
465. See Steiker, supra note 384, at 1478-79.
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Prospective appellants separate into two categories: those that have
exhausted their direct appeals, and those with remaining potential for state
remedy.466 Ring should operate retroactively for those with pending appeals
before their respective state courts.467 Defendants who have exhausted their
direct appeals must wage a collateral attack upon their sentences by seeking
federal habeas corpus relief.468 These defendants must overcome significant
hurdles in an attempt to apply Ring retroactively.469
Current federal law and the corresponding Supreme Court jurisprudence
in the area of retroactivity, while somewhat ambiguous, dictates that
defendants whose decisions were contrary to established federal procedural
law may seek to apply a decision retroactively. 470  As for those decisions
establishing "new rules," the Supreme Court has distinguished between rules
of procedural law as opposed to substantive law for purposes of
retroactivity. 47' New substantive rules may apply retroactively, while new
procedural rules do not unless they fit into an exception.472
Appellants basing arguments on Ring may contend that Ring produced a
new rule of substantive law, and accordingly should apply retroactively.
473
However, at least one federal court has already ruled that Ring announced a
procedural rule rather than a substantive one.474 In addition, while several
states have applied Ring to cases with pending appeals, at least two have
466. According to the Supreme Court, "failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to
criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication."
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987). Therefore, inmates with remaining direct appeals
will utilize this rule on appeal to apply Ring retroactively. Id. Inmates that have exhausted their
direct appeals must attempt to overcome Teague's presumption against retroactivity by arguing
either that Ring simply extended a clearly established rule or, in the alternative, that Ring fits an
exception to the general rule of retroactivity announced in Teague. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 (1989); Steiker, supra note 384, at 1478-79.
467. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 ("failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal
cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication."). Two such
condemned men brought Ring-based appeals in Colorado. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo.
2003). The Colorado Supreme Court recognized Ring's applicability, vacating both men's death
sentences and imposing terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id.
468. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court
may apply for to a federal court for relief based on the theory that he is in custody "in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).
469. See A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of "New Rules" and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10-18 (2002).
470. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000); see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
471. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618-20 (1998) (holding that Teague does not apply
to new rules of substantive criminal law).
472. Teague, 489 U.S. at 288; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 619.
473. An Alabama death-row inmate, George Everette Sibley, Jr., brought such an appeal in a
federal habeas corpus petition. Sibley v. Culliver, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
474. Id. at 1293. The court relied on the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation that Apprendi had stated
a new rule of procedural rather than substantive law in deciding that the rule announced in Ring was
procedural as well. id. at 1289 (citing McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1257-58 (1 lth Cir.
2001)).
refused to apply Ring retroactively to appellants who have exhausted their
appeals.475
As for decisions that provide for "new rules" of procedural law, the
Court defined "new rule" as one that "breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government. 4 76 Appellants wishing
to argue that Ring simply extended the clearly established premise of
Apprendi, will face the obstacle that Apprendi specifically exempted capital
cases from its holding and distinguished the Court's Walton rule.477 Should
condemned appellants fail in arguing that Ring represents a firmly
established rule, they will argue that Ring fits one of the Teague
exceptions.478
The first Teague exception insists that "a new rule should be applied
retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.'
479
The second exception applies solely to "those new procedures without which
the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. ' 480 Current
Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area dictates that a decision should not
apply retroactively unless the Supreme Court so rules.481 One federal circuit
recognized this fact in early 2003, dismissing an argument for Ring's
retroactive application in the death penalty appeal of Carey D. Moore, a man
condemned to death in Nebraska.482 However, in September of 2003, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Ring retroactively.483 In response to
that decision, the United States Supreme Court will soon decide the
retroactivity issue in the context of Ring-based appeals.484
475. See State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 830 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Lotter, 664 N.W.2d 892, 902-08
(Neb. 2003). Contra State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 271 (Mo. 2003) (applying Ring to an
appellant whose appeals had been exhausted).
476. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Supreme Court jurisprudence has been somewhat convoluted in
defining precisely what constitutes a "new rule." See Bryant, supra note 469, at 10-23.
477. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496-97 (1999).
478. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. ("Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced.").
479. Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
480. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313; see Benjamin P. Cooper, Truth in Sentencing: The Prospective and
Retroactive Application of Simmons v. South Carolina, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1573 (1996).
481. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001) (holding that "a new rule is not 'made retroactive to
cases on collateral review' unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive") (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000)).
482. Moore v. Kinney, 320 F.3d 767, 771 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court
did not, and has not, expressly made the ruling in Ring retroactive"). Moore also recognized the
dissent's mention of retroactivity. Id. In Ring, the dissent cited Teague as confirmation that current
death row inmates "will be barred from taking advantage of today's holding on federal collateral
review." Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
483. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part, Schiro v.
Summerlin, No. 03-526, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8574 (Dec. 1, 2003).
484. Schiro v. Summerlin, No. 03-526, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8574 (Dec. 1, 2003) (granting certiorari
in part).
572
[Vol. 31: 519, 2004] The Sixth and Eighth Amendments Collide
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER
It may take years before the ramifications of Ring become fully clear.
What is apparent is that Ring has significantly influenced the sphere of
American capital punishment. In just fourteen months, Ring has altered the
sentencing procedures of more than one-fourth of the death penalty states.485
Portions of the sentencing schemes of at least two other states remain in
question.486 Men and women living under capital sentences in affected
states will doubtlessly challenge their sentences based on Ring, forcing
federal and state courts to consider whether their sentences should be
reconsidered and whether Ring should apply retroactively.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona marks the culmination
of a thirty-year foray into constitutional law encompassing both the Sixth
and Eighth Amendments. Three decades after Furman, the states that
choose capital punishment as a component of their penal systems possess
crucial guidance as to the constitutional requirements necessary to the
imposition of that most severe punishment.487 More importantly, Ring
granted capital defendants a vital Sixth Amendment protection: the right to a
jury determination of facts necessary to deprive them of their lives.488
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485. See supra notes 324-29 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 373-84, 404-27 and accompanying text.
487. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
488. Id. at 595-607.
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